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I. INTRODUCTION
O N OCrOBER 1, 1976, Amended House Bill 531 became effective as
sections 2307.31 and 2307.32 of the Ohio Revised Code. As stated in
the preamble,' the purpose of the Act is to provide for the contribution
among two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort. Like all
new legislation, it is bound to have a certain amount of "teething prob-
lems" in its initial use. This Article will discuss some of the anticipated
problems, and propose suggested means for resolving them.
These suggestions are, for the most part, based on Ohio law be-
cause the author is convinced that, in the first instance, the Act must
be interpreted in the context of existing law. The reader should be
aware, however, that the Act is an all but verbatim copy of the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, and the construction placed upon
that statute by other states will be useful to the Ohio practitioner and
courts. 2 Nevertheless, existing Ohio law is more relevant to the inter-
pretation of the Act than the decisions of sister states which have like
legislation because the basic, underlying law of those states may be
quite different than the basic, underlying law of Ohio.
The heart of the new law is found in section 2307.31(A)3 which
indicates that several elements must combine before the right of con-
tribution comes into existence. In the following pages each of these
elements will be discussed and the problems arising in connection with
each will be explored. Following the discussion of the elements of the
right to contribution there will appear a discussion of the various pro-
cedural means for enforcing the right to contribution.
II. THE ELEMN-rs OF CONrnBUTION
A. Injury to Person or Property
First, one or more persons must have been injured in their person or
property, or must have been wrongfully killed. For the sake of con-
venience, we may refer to the person injured or the person killed as
* B.S., John Carroll Univ.; M.S.L.S., Case Western Reserve Univ.; J.D., Univ. of De-
troit; Member, Ohio and Michigan Bars; Professor of Law, Cleveland State Univ. College
of Law.
I OIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.31-.32 (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)). For the full
text of the Act see Appendix.
2 The reader who wishes to consult the decisions of other states may look to the anno-
tations to those decisions which accompany the text of the UNIFORM CoNrIartmoN AMONc
TORTFEASORS Acr, 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 57 (1975).
The text of section 2307.31(A) provides, in part:
[W]here two or more persons are jointly or severally liable in tort for the same
injury to person or property or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of
contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against
all or any of them. The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor
who has paid more than his proportionate share of the common liability, and his
total recovery is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his proportionate
share.
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(A) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)).
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the claimant, since that is the short-hand term employed by the Act
itself.4
The meaning of wrongful death is hardly in doubt; it is the death of
a person caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default which would have
entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages
if death had not ensued.5 But what is meant by injury to person, and
injury to property?
Obviously, injury to person means physical injury to the body of the
person. But is it limited to that, or does it mean more? Note that the
Act speaks of "injury to person," and not "injury to the person," or
"bodily injury to persons." Had the General Assembly intended to
limit the phrase to physical injury to the body, it could have chosen
"bodily injury to persons," as it did in Ohio Revised Code section
2305.31,6 or it could have chosen "injury to the person," which is not
as precise, as "bodily injury," but which carries with it the same basic
connotation. Indeed, in addition to section 2305.31, there are some 37
sections of the Ohio Revised Code in which the General Assembly has
used the term "bodily injury" when it has meant physical injury to the
body of a person, and at least 3 in which it has used "injury to the
person." However, "injury to person or property," or a slight varia-
tion thereof, is used in at least 5 sections of the Code in a context which
makes it clear that only physical injury to the body is meant by "injury
to person."7  Thus, comparison of statutory language is, at best, in-
conclusive.
Nevertheless, the question demands resolution. There are a num-
ber of torts which invade personal rights without necessarily producing
bodily injury. False arrest, defamation, and invasion of privacy are
examples. Two or more tortfeasors, acting jointly or concurrently, can
commit any one of these torts without having a specific intent to cause
the resulting injury." If the phrase "injury to person" includes not only
tortious invasions of the claimant's bodily integrity, but also tortious
invasions of the claimant's rights as a person, a tortfeasor jointly or
severally liable for such invasion, or his or her subrogated insurance
carrier, might have a claim for contribution under the Act. On the
other hand, a conservative reading of the Act will limit contribution to
those torts which cause physical injury to the body. Which is the cor-
rect interpretation?
4 See, for example, OHuo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(B) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976))
which speaks of a tortfeasor's settlement "with a claimant," and OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.32(C) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)) which refers to a claimant's right of action
against "the tortfeasor."
' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (Page 1968); see also OHIO CONsT. art. 1, § 19a.
' See the text of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.31 (Page Supp. 1975) at note 86 infra.
7 See Osuo REV. CODE ANN. § 723.54 (Page 1976); id. § 1302.89 (Page 1962); id.
§ 1533.181 (Page 1964); id. § 4155.13 (Page 1973); id. § 5503.02 (Page 1970).
8 While these torts are often described as intentional torts, they are not necessarily
intentional as that term is used in the Act. See text accompanying notes 51-61 infra.
Further, the Personal Injury Liability Insurance coverage part of the Comprehensive Gen-
eral Liability-Automobile Policy provides at least limited coverage for liability resulting
from the commission of torts such as these. See note 52 infra.
1976]
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Ohio Revised Code section 1.59 tells us that unless the statute speci-
fies otherwise, person "includes an individual, corporation, business
trust, estate, trust, partnership, and association." 9 This gives some clue
to the correct interpretation. Individuals, of course, have physical
bodies which can be injured as well as personal rights which can be
invaded; but corporations, business trusts, estates, trusts, partnerships,
and associations are legal concepts and not physical entities. They
only have personal rights to the extent that the law gives them rights.
Therefore, since they are included within the meaning of the term per-
son, the phrase "injury to person" must include invasion of personal
rights as well as injury to the physical body; otherwise, these persons
could not be injured in their person. This accords with Ohio Revised
Code section 1.11, which urges a liberal reading of remedial laws.'0
Therefore, it is suggested that injury to person means not only
physical injuries to the body of the claimant; but also invasions of rights
which belong to the claimant as a person, at least to the extent that the
injury is not specifically intended and, possibly, to the extent that
liability insurance is available against such invasions." The fact that
liability insurance is available against such torts is a strong indication
that it would not be against public policy to permit contribution, for if
the public policy of the state demanded that liability be left solely with
the tortfeasor responsible, liability insurance for such torts would be
prohibited.
Injury to property presents similar difficulties. Clearly, the phrase
includes physical damage to tangible property. But is it limited to that
or does it also include the taking of the claimant's property, or the
interference with, or destruction of the claimant's property rights?
Ohio Revised Code section 1.59 is again pertinent. 2 This section de-
fines property as both real and personal property. Pertinent though
this definition may be, it is not very helpful, for we must now ascertain
the meaning of real and personal property. Real property consists of
lands, tenements, and hereditaments, 3 while personal property con-
sists of all objects and rights which are capable of ownership except
freehold estates in land, and incorporeal hereditaments issuing out of
or exercisable within the same.'4 In short, the term property extends
to every species of valuable right and interest.' 5 That being so, injury
to property is not limited to physical injury to tangible property, but
embraces injury to intangible property rights as well.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.59 (Page Supp. 1975).
10 Id. § 1.11 (Page 1969) which provides, in part:
Remedial laws and all proceedings under them shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining justice. The
rule of the common law that statutes in derogation of the common law must be
strictly construed has no application to remedial laws ....
II See text accompanying notes 51-61 infra.
'2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.59 (Page Supp. 1975).
13 44 OHIO JuR. 2d Property §§ 8, 9 (1960).
14 Id. § 11.
1' Turnpike Co. v. Parks, 50 Ohio St. 568, 576, 35 N.E. 304, 305 (1893).
[Vol. 25:151
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B. Common Liability for the Injury
Two or more tortfeasors must share a common liability for the injury
to, or death of, the claimant. This common liability is liability in fact
rather than judicially declared liability, since the right of contribution
will exist "even though judgment has not been recovered against all or
any of them,"16 and since contribution may be enforced by separate
action "whether or not judgment has been entered in an action against
two or more tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death."' 7  In
addition, the liability must qualify as legal liability; moral liability is
not sufficient to give rise to the right of contribution.' s
But this concept of legal liability in fact presents some difficulties.
Is legal liability "liability" within the meaning of the Act if it is not
susceptible to judicial declaration as such? A common fact pattern will
illustrate the problem. The XYZ Corporation contracts with the ABC
Company for the construction of a building on land owned by XYZ.
ABC is subject to, and fully complies with, the Workers' Compensation
Law of Ohio. Doe and Roe are fellow employees, employed by ABC.
While acting within the course and scope of his employment, Roe
negligently creates a dangerous condition at the job site. By proper
inspection, XYZ could have discovered the condition and could have
required ABC to eliminate it. But XYZ made no inspection, and in
time, the condition caused injury to Doe. In the abstract, Roe is legally
liable to Doe for negligently creating the condition which caused Doe's
injury; ABC is legally liable to Doe under the doctrine of respondeat
superior; and XYZ is legally liable to Doe for a violation of the "Fre-
quenter" statute. 9 However, Doe may not sue Roe if Doe's injury is
compensable under the Workers' Compensation Law,20 nor may he sue
ABC whether or not his injury is compensable under that Law.2'
Thus, the only liability which is susceptible to judicial declaration is the
liability of XYZ. If XYZ is judicially found to be liable to Doe, may it
"I OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(A) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)).
17 Id. § 2307.31(C).
S As it is said in section 2307.31(F), "principles of equity applicable to contribution
generally shall apply." OHIO REV. COoE ANN. § 2307.31(F) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)).
Thus, the right of contribution is, by its very nature, equitable, and as the old maxim has
it, equity will not aid a volunteer. He who pays a "liability" which he is not legally bound
to pay is a volunteer, and has no legitimate claim to a right of contribution. Bankers
Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Hardware & Forging Co., 77 Ohio App. 121, 62 N.E.2d 180
(1945).
"9 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4101.11-12 (Page 1973).
20 Id. § 4123.741, which provides in material part:
No employee . . . shall be liable to respond in damages at common law or by
statute for any injury . . . received . . . by any other employee . . . in the
course of and arising out of the latter employee's employment . . . on the con-
dition that such injury . . . is found to be compensable under sections 4123.01
to 4123.94, inclusive, of the Revised Code.
21 Id. § 4123.74 provides, in material part:
Employers who comply with section 4123.35 of the Revised Code shall not be
liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for any injury . . .
received . . . by any employee in the course of or arising out of his employment
. . . whether or not such injury . . . is compensable under section 4123.01 to
4123.94, inclusive, of the Revised Code.
1976]
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seek contribution from either ABC or from Roe? In New York, it
probably could,22 but in Ohio it may not be able to.23
The Ohio cases most closely on point are those in which the third
party tortfeasor attempts to obtain indemnity from the employer on
the theory of primary-secondary negligence. In the absence of an ex-
press indemnity agreement, the courts have held that provisions of the
Workers' Compensation Law and the Ohio Constitution bar such suits
for indemnity.24
While this conclusion is unwarranted by the actual language of the
Constitution and the statute,2 5 it is the prevailing view; and unless
22 Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382
(1972). For an interesting introductory discussion of the problem, see W. MALONE, M.
PLANT & J. LIrrLE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 504 (1974).
23 In Republic Steel v. Glaros, 12 Ohio App. 2d 29, 230 N.E.2d 667 (1967), it is said,
without explanation, that the doctrine of contribution does not apply. This conclusion
can be explained on any one of three grounds: (1) in that case, recovery was premised
on the terms of an express indemnity agreement between the employer and the third
party tortfeasor, and not upon the right of contribution; (2) there is nothing in the case
which would indicate that the employer was in any way responsible for the injury to the
employee; and (3) the doctrine of contribution was not recognized in Ohio at the time the
case was decided.
24 Id.; St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Kopp, 70 Ohio L. Abs. 259, 121 N.E.2d 23 (Ct.
App. 1954); Bankers Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Hardware & Forging Co., 77 Ohio App.
121, 62 N.E.2d 180, appeal dismissed, 145 Ohio St. 615, 62 N.E.2d 251 (1945).
Judge Morgan best states the rationale in his concurring opinion in Bankers Indemnity.
He states that the provision in the Ohio Constitution, see note 25 infra,
is intended to give and does give to the employer who complies with the condi-
tions complete protection from any and every claim against him based on the
death of or injuries to any of his employees. . . .Employers in this state have
been rightly encouraged to rely that by paying the premium and compensation
provided by the workmen's compensation laws of the state they have complete
protection from any further claims of any kind by reason of the death of or in-
juries to its employees, except where specific exceptions may be made by statute
and none such is claimed in this case. To hold that employers are not so protected
would undermine, in my opinion, the basic principles of workmen's compensation
in this state.
77 Ohio App. at 134, 62 N.E.2d at 185 (emphasis added).
5 OIo CONST. art. II, § 35 states:
Such compensation shall be in lieu of all other rights to compensation or dam-
ages, for such death, injuries, or occupational disease, and any employer who
pays the premium or compensation provided by law, passed in accordance here-
with, shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for
such death, injuries or occupational disease.
The language of the statutes is essentially the same: "Employers who comply . .. shall
not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for any injury ...
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (Page 1973); "no employee ... shall be liable to respond
in damages at common law or by statute for any injury . . ." Id. § 4123.74. When this
language is read in context, the clear implication is that the employer or fellow employee
will not be liable to respond in damages to the injured employee. There is nothing in the
language or the context that justifies the conclusion that the employer or the fellow em-
ployee is immune from claims presented by persons other than the injured employee;
nothing that warrants the court in saying that the employer or fellow employee is to be
held free "from any and every claim against him," or "from any further clal3ns of any
kind."
But this does not solve the problem. The problem lies in the meaning of the phrase
"shall not be liable to respond in damages." Does this mean that the employer or fellow
employee is liable for the injury, but cannot be sued for damages in a civil action, or
does it mean that the employer or fellow employee is not liable at all, and therefore
cannot be made to "respond in damages?" In other words, does the phrase defeat only
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol25/iss2/3
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section 2307.31 can be construed as a specific statutory exception,2 6
it precludes the application of the doctrine of contribution to the same
extent the application of the doctrine of indemnity is precludedY.2
This example, however, does not necessarily conclude the question
since it may be argued that the language of the Constitution as well as
the language of sections 4123.74 and 4123.741 of the Ohio Revised
Code defeats liability itself, and does not simply preclude a judicial
determination of that liability. But that will be equally true in almost
every case in which liability is not susceptible to judicial determination.
Thus, while this specific example does not conclude the question, it
does suggest the most likely answer: If legal liability is not susceptible
to a judicial declaration of liability, it is not "liability" as that term is
used in the Act.
To return to the second element of the right to contribution as
exemplified by the language of the Act: The two or more tortfeasors
must be "jointly or severally" liable, and it is here, in the use of the
disjunctive "or" rather than the conjunctive "and" that another diffi-
culty arises. No doubt the General Assembly had in mind the creation
of a right of contribution between joint or concurrent tortfeasors.
the injured employee's right to sue, or does it defeat liability itself? If it only defeats the
injured employee's right to sue, the third party tortfeasor's action for indemnity is not
necessarily precluded. But, if liability itself is defeated a third party tortfeasor's action
for indemnity is also necessarily precluded, and for two reasons.
In the absence of an express indemnity agreement, the third party tortfeasor's claim
for indemnity will, as a general rule, be premised on the theory of primary-secondary
liability - the third party tortfeasor alleging he is only secondarily liable, while the em-
ployer or the fellow employee is primarily liable. But if the Workers' Compensation Law
defeats the liability of the employer or fellow employee there can be no question of primary-
secondary liability and consequently no claim for indemnity. That is the first reason.
The second reason looks to the origin of the third party tortfeasor's claim. In attempting
to rationalize the claim for indemnity, many courts hold that when the secondarily liable
third party tortfeasor compensates the injured party, he or she either becomes subrogated
to that party's claim against the person primarily liable, or takes an equitable assignment
of the injured party's claim against the person primarily liable. But the subrogee or as-
signee takes no greater right than that possessed by the subrogor or the assignor. Since
the employer or fellow employee cannot be liable to the injured employee, the injured
employee has no right to pass on to the third party tortfeasor. Therefore, the third party
tortfeasor has no right which he or she can assert in the claim for indemnity.
How have the Ohio courts interpreted the phrase? The answer is far from clear,
since the language used in the various decisions has been ambiguous. However, Green-
walt v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 164 Ohio St. 1, 128 N.E.2d 116 (1955); and Bevis v.
Armco Steel Corp., 156 Ohio St. 295, 102 N.E.2d 444 (1951) strongly suggest the abolition
of liability. Indeed, from the history of the constitutional provision and the statutes given
in Bevis, one is compelled to the conclusion that it is the liability itself, and not merely the
right to sue, which has been abrogated.
26 There is nothing in the language of Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.31-.32 (Page
Legis. Bull. 389-90 (1976)) which would lead one to the belief that the right of contribu-
tion is a specific exception to Otuo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4123.74-.741 (Page 1973). To be
a specific exception, the Act would have to at least make reference to these latter sec-
tions of the Revised Code, and it does not.
27 This appears to be the prevailing view. See Madrin v. Wareham, 344 F. Supp. 166
(W.D. Pa. 1972) and the authorities therein cited. A review of the Ohio Act leads to the
same conclusion. An essential element of contribution under the Act is that both tort-
feasors be liable to the claimant. But the language of the Constitution and the Workers'
Compensation Law abrogates the liability of the tortfeasor-employer or the tortfeasor-fellow
employee. See note 25 supra. Since both tortfeasors cannot be liable to the claimant,
the right of contribution does not arise.
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Since the liability of both joint tortfeasors and concurrent tortfeasors is
generally described as being "joint" or "joint and several, '" 28 by using
the phrase "jointly or severally" rather than the traditional "jointly
and severally," the General Assembly may have intended to reach
beyond joint and concurrent tortfeasors to provide for contribution
between tortfeasors who are only "severally" liable to the claimant.
Such an expansion might be legitimate in certain cases involving suc-
cessive tortfeasors.
Were it not for the specific holding of the supreme court in Travelers
Indemnity Co. v. Trowbridge,29 the facts of that case would illustrate
a situation that is susceptible to the application of the new doctrine.
One Dlusky was injured in an explosion caused by the negligence of
Republic Steel Corporation. While receiving surgical treatment for
that injury, he was further injured through the negligence of the treat-
ing physician. The supreme court found that Republic and the physi-
cian were neither joint nor concurrent tortfeasors, but rather succes-
sive tortfeasors, and that both were severally liable to Dlusky for the
second injury. 0  The court remarked further that if Republic was
held liable for more than its proportionate share of the second injury,
it was entitled to some equitable relief against the physician .3  Finally,
the court noted the absence of a right of contribution in Ohio,3 2 and
sought a remedy in contribution's nearest analog - indemnity. Thus,
it held that Republic had a right to seek indemnity from the physician. 33
Had contribution been available, there is little doubt that the court
would have employed it. Only in the absence of contribution did the
court feel compelled to break new ground and fashion a remedy based
on the principle of indemnity. 4  Ironically, it is this creation of the
21 See, e.g., Clauss v. Fields, 29 Ohio App. 2d 93, 278 N.E.2d 677 (1971).
29 41 Ohio St. 2d 11, 321 N.E.2d 787 (1975).
30 Id. at 15, 321 N.E.2d at 790:
The physician and the tortfeasor are not typical concurrent tortfeasors but, rather,
are more in the nature of successive tortfeasors. However, the original tortfeasor
is responsible for the negligence of the physician because the tortfeasor's negli-
gence created the risk (the injury) and the occasion for the independent negli-
gence of the physician. The negligence of the physician does not constitute a
sufficient break in the chain of causation to absolve the original tortfeasor from
liability.
31 Id. at 16, 321 N.E.2d at 790:
[T]he rationale, that he who actively causes an injury should be responsible to
another who is liable for such injury because of his own negligence but who did
not actively create such injury, produces a just and equitable result.
32 Id. at 15-16, 321 N.E.2d at 790.
33 Id. at 16, 321 N.E.2d at 790:
We conclude that a tortfeasor, who negligently causes an injury, has a righlt to
indemnity from a physician who negligently causes a new injury or aggravates
the existing injury during the course of his treatment of the injury caused by the
tortfeasor.
34 The novelty of the court's approach was noted id. at 16, 321 N.E.2d at 790:
Although the instant situation does not clearly fall either into the category of
concurrent tortfeasors or into the category of the situations where primary and
secondary liability exists, we find that the relationship between an original tort-
feasor and a physician who negligently treats the injury caused by the tortfeasor
falls closer, and more equitably, into the latter category than the former. We
(Vol. 25:151
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right of indemnity in the absence of a right of contribution which, as a
practical matter, precludes the application of the new doctrine of con-
tribution in this specific instance.
35
While the Trowbridge decision appears to foreclose the application
of the doctrine of contribution in cases where a physician's negligent
treatment aggravates the original injury, the decision does not neces-
sarily preclude the operation of the doctrine in other cases of several
liability. In such cases, it would appear that the courts may now choose
between the competing principles of indemnity and contribution.
It will be interesting to observe whether they follow the trail blazed by
Trowbridge and apply the principle of indemnity or make use of the
leeway granted by the phrase "jointly or severally" to employ the
principle of contribution.
It should be noted, however, that the doctrine of contribution will
not apply in all cases involving successive tortfeasors who are severally
liable to the claimant. If the above reading of the phrase "jointly or
severally" is a correct one, .the Act still requires that the two tort-
feasors be severally liable for the "same injury to person or property or
for the same wrongful death.36 The Trowbridge situation qualified,
at least in theory, because both tortfeasors were severally liable for the
second injury. In many cases involving successive tortfeasors each
tortfeasor is severally liable for separate acts which produce separate
and distinct injuries, and in those cases the application of the doctrine
of contribution is precluded. There may be situations, however, when
two injuries may so merge in effect as to be medically inseparable.
When the two injuries, though separable in point of time, become one
indivisible injury in effect, the extent of the liability for each injury
cannot be allocated with reasonable certainty as between the suc-
cessive tortfeasors, and the injuries become, for all practical purposes,
indivisible as to cause.
In Ryan v. Mackolin,37 the Ohio Supreme Court was faced with a
fact situation which nearly achieved that goal. Ryan received the
first injury to his back when his automobile was "rear-ended" by Boley.
Approximately 5 months later, Ryan again received injury to his back
when his automobile was rear-ended by Mackolin. After the second
injury, Ryan brought suit against both Boley and Mackolin, seeking a
joint judgment on the theory that his injuries were indivisible and the
liability could not be allocated with reasonable certainty between the
successive collisions. The supreme court disagreed on the facts of the
case, and disallowed a joint judgment, but in so doing the court sug-
view this issue as one of first impression, not controlled by any of the prior deci-
sions of this court.
3- OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(D) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)) states:
This Section does not impair any right of indemnity under existing lawv. Where
one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the right of the indemnity
obligee is for indemnity and not contribution, and the indemnity obligor is not
entitled to contribution from the obligee for any portion of his indemnity obliga-
tion.
36 Id. § 2307.31(A).
37 14 Ohio St. 2d 213, 237 N.E.2d 377 (1968).
1976]
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gested that under the right set of facts a joint judgment would have
been appropriate even though the liability of each tortfeasor was
several.38 In the appropriate circumstances, it would seem only proper
that the tortfeasor who paid more than his or her proportionate share of
the joint judgment should have a right to seek contribution from the
other tortfeasor, and the use of the disjunctive phrase "jointly or
severally" would warrant an interpretation which would make the new
Act applicable to such a situation.
While the use of the disjunctive may, in an appropriate case, permit
the application of the Act to tortfeasors who are neither joint nor
concurrent, such an interpretation is not mandated. There are explana-
tions of the phrase "jointly or severally" which would justify a more
narrow application of the doctrine. As previously noted,39 the liability
of joint tortfeasors and concurrent tortfeasors is traditionally described
as "joint" or "joint and several." That liability would be described in
the Act as "jointly or jointly and severally liable in tort for the same
injury to person or property or for the same wrongful death." That
is an awkward phrase. A draftsman with an eye to style might well
try to compass "jointly or jointly and severally" with a short-hand
reference, and "jointly or severally" would be a logical choice, because
it contains both elements of the longer phrase: "joint" and "joint and
several" liability.
The disjunctive may also have been used because of the ambiva-
lence in the law with respect to the meaning of "jointly and severally
liable." That phrase has one meaning with respect to how joint and
concurrent tortfeasors may be sued by the injured party, but quite
another when it comes to the type of judgment that may be entered
against them.
As far as suit is concerned, the injured party may enforce his claim
against either joint or concurrent tortfeasors in an action against all
of them jointly, against any one of them severally, or against any
number less than the whole. In this sense, then, both joint and con-
current tortfeasors are "jointly and severally liable." It is equally true
that in this sense there is no particular magic in the use of the dis-
junctive or the conjunctive. When it is said that joint or concurrent
tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable, it means that they may be
joined in one suit against all, or they may be sued in actions against
each severally. The phrase "jointly or severally" imports neither more
nor less than that.
Judgments are a different matter. If the injured party sues the tort-
31 Id. at 222, 237 N.E.2d at 383:
[F]ollowing the first collision Ryan was hospitalized and received medical treat-
ment for an injury to his back. The nature and extent of the disabling effect of
that collision having been subject to medical scrutiny, we cannot assume that
however indivisible in effect plaintiff's back injury became after the second col-
lision, it will be incapable of separation as to cause. The sequence of events here
is not such that, however difficult, it should be insurmountable to chart the course
of cause to effect as a subsequent event adds its force to the flow.
(Citations omitted.)
39 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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feasors severally, he or she may obtain a several judgment against
each, since each is severally liable for the full amount of the damage
occasioned by the tortious wrong. This is true whether the tortfeasors
are joint or concurrent. Likewise, if the injured party sues the tort-
feasors jointly, he or she may obtain a several judgment against each
regardless of whether they are characterized as joint or concurrent.
But if the injured party seeks a joint judgment in a joint suit, he or
she may receive it only as against joint tortfeasors; that is, tortfeasors
who are in pari delicto. As for concurrent tortfeasors who do not act
in concert, only several judgments are permitted. Thus, as far as
judgments are concerned, only joint tortfeasors are truly jointly and
severally liable.
The difficulty arises from the fact that the courts use the terms
loosely. All joint tortfeasors are concurrent tortfeasors because their
actions concur in point of time and in point of consequence, but not all
concurrent tortfeasors are joint because they do not act in concert to
produce the injury; at best, their actions concur only in point of con-
sequence. To the extent that a concurrent tortfeasor does not qualify as
a joint tortfeasor, he or she is subject only to a several judgment.
Thus, concurrent tortfeasors are jointly or severally liable in judgment
depending upon whether they are both joint and concurrent tortfeasors
or concurrent only. Accordingly, the phrase "jointly or severally" more
accurately captures the liability in judgment of both joint tortfeasors
and truly concurrent tortfeasors than does the phrase "jointly and
severally," and it may be that this is why it was used in the Act.40
C. Liability in Tort
The joint or several common liability of the two or more tortfeasors
must be liability in tort. As a practical matter, this element will present
few problems since, in most cases, the claimant will be seeking re-
covery for injuries or death caused by the negligence of the tortfeasors.
Nevertheless, the demise of the common law forms of action, and the
substitution of more liberal requirements of Rules pleading have
blurred the boundaries between tort and contract. Under the new Rules
of Civil Procedure 4 a complaint is sufficient if it sets forth the basic
operative facts underlying the plaintiff's claim; it need no longer state
the plaintiff's theory of recovery. 42 It may be difficult to determine
from a modem complaint whether the plaintiff's action sounds in tort or
40 If neither of these two arguments are enough to satisfy a court seeking a conser-
vative interpretation of the Act, that court can take refuge in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.02(H)
(Page 1969) which provides:
As used in the Revised Code, unless the context otherwise requires. . . . (H)
"And" may be read "or," and "or" may be read "and" if the sense requires it.
41 Specifically, Otuo R. Civ. P. 8.
42 See, e.g., Slife v. Kundtz Properties, 40 Ohio App. 2d 179, 182, 318 N.E.2d 557, 560
(1974) where the court said:
Actually few complaints fail to meet the liberal standards of Rule 8 and become
subject to dismissal. . . . All that the civil rules require is a short, plain statement
of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and
the grounds upon which it is based.
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in contract. lacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp.43 is a good example.
Iacono entered into an oral agreement with Padovan Construction Com-
pany for the installation of a driveway, patio, and sidewalk at Iacono's
home. Padovan secured the concrete for the job from Anderson Con-
crete Corp. Iacono was dissatisfied, and brought suit against both
Padovan and Anderson. The trial court apparently thought the claim
against Anderson sounded in tort for breach of an implied warranty.
The court of appeals thought it sounded in contract, and reversed the
judgment against Anderson due to a lack of privity of contract between
Iacono and Anderson. The supreme court agreed with the lower court's
interpretation and noted that under the modern rules of civil procedure
"all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.""
One presumes that this same rule of liberality will apply when the
pleadings are being tested for the purpose of obtaining contribution.
Of course, the pleadings alone are not controlling as to the nature
of the tortfeasor's liability. If a case goes to judgment, the nature of
the judgment debtor's liability will be determined on the basis of both
the pleadings and the evidence presented at trial.45 Thus, in some
cases, contribution may appear appropriate from the pleadings, but will
be defeated by the proofs. The basic fact pattern of Iacono will illus-
trate: Suppose that the pleadings allege breach of implied warranty
against both Padovan and Anderson, and assume that contribution will
lie if both are found liable on that claim. Suppose further that at the
trial Iacono proves breach of implied warranty against Anderson, but
only simple breach of contract against Padovan. 46 In such event, there
could be no contribution between Padovan and Anderson because, as
the Act states, each of the parties involved in the claim for contribution
must be liable in tort to the claimant. Since, in our supposition, Padovan
was liable to the claimant in contract and Anderson was liable in tort,
the essential prerequisite of liability in tort would not exist, and should
one pay the full judgment he could not seek contribution from the
other.
At least two other situations can present problems: Suppose that a
particular injury caused by two or more tortfeasors is inflicted under
circumstances such that the claimant has the option of making the
complaint sound in tort or in contract; and suppose that, in order to
cut off a particular defendant's right to contribution, the claimant so
drafts the complaint that it claims recovery for breach of contract only.
Or, suppose that in a proper case a claimant believes that a restitu-
tionary remedy would be more advantageous than compensatory dam-
41 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975).
44 Id. at 92, 326 N.E.2d at 270 quoting from OHIO R. Crv. P. 8(F).
4s Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975); Slife v. Kundtz
Properties, 40 Ohio App. 2d 179, 318 N.E.2d 557 (1974); Van Curen v. Mayfield, 40
Ohio App. 2d 147, 318 N.E.2d 550 (1974).
4' As the supreme court read the complaint in lacono, it stated alternative claims for
either breach of contract or for breach of an implied warranty. 42 Ohio St. 2d at 92,
326 N.E.2d at 270.
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ages, and "waives the tort and sues in assumpsit."47  In determining
whether a claim for contribution lies, is the court bound by the form
in which the action is brought, or may it go behind the form to the
substance? The better answer is to be found in those cases which
have dealt with a like problem in connection with the applicable
statute of limitations. The supreme court in Andrianos v. Community
Traction Co., solved the problem by holding that an action to recover
damages for bodily injury was governed by a two-year statute of
limitations regardless of whether the action was in tort or for breach
of contract. 4
8
An analogy can be drawn for the right of contribution. That right
arises out of joint or several liability in tort for the same injury to per-
son or property or for the same wrongful death. The right should be
annexed to the cause of action rather than the form of action. Thus,
the element of liability in tort refers to the nature or subject matter
of the action and not to its form as a matter of remedial procedure.
As the court in Andrianos concluded, it makes no difference whether
the action to recover damages for injury to person or property, or for
wrongful death, is in theory ex contractu or ex delicto; nor does it
matter that the claimant may elect between the two forms of action.49
Not all tort liability will support a claim for contribution. The Act
contains two direct exceptions and one indirect exception to the general
rule that there is a right of contribution between two or more tortfeasors
who are jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person
or property or for the same wrongful death.
First, the Act explicitly denies the right of contribution to those
tortfeasors who have "intentionally caused" the injury or wrongful
death.5 0  It should be noted that only the tortfeasor guilty of intentional
conduct is deprived of the right of contribution. Thus, if one of two
tortfeasors causes injury or wrongful death through negligence, and
the other through intentional misconduct, the one guilty of negligence
" J. L. Adolphus puts it this way:
Thoughts much too deep for tears subdue the Court
When I assumpsit bring, and god-like waive a tort.
Adolphus, The Circuiteers, 1 L.Q. REV. 232, 233 (1885).
48 155 Ohio St. 47, 51, 97 N.E.2d 549, 552 (1951):
Surely, the General Assembly did not intend to create different periods of limita-
tions for the recovery of damages growing out of bodily injury, depending on the
form of the action brought. No matter what form is adopted, the essence of the
action is the wrongful injury, and that it arose from the breach of an express or
implied contract is immaterial.
In other words, the term "action," as used in Section [2305.10, Revised Code],
refers to the nature or subject matter thereof and not to its form as a matter of
remedial procedure. Whether the action is strictly in tort or for breach of contract,
it is nonetheless an action to recover damages for bodily injury and is governed by
the two-year limitation prescribed by Section [2305.10, Revised Code].
" Id. Otno REV. CODE ANN. § 1.47(C) (Page 1969) should not be overlooked. It pro-
vides: "In enacting a statute, it is presumed that ... (C) a just and reasonable result is
intended."
50 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(A) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)) provides:
There is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally
caused or intentionally contributed to the injury or wrongfui death.
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(all other things being equal) has the right of contribution from the
one guilty of intentional wrong, but not vice versa.
But when is injury or wrongful death "intentionally caused?" The
answer is not without difficulties in part created by the existence of
liability insurance. Because subrogated liability insurers are entitled to
the same right of contribution as their insured, 5' it is reasonable to seek
a definition in the judicial interpretations of similar clauses found in
liability insurance policies. Indeed, it would be unjust to require a
liability insurer to make payment because its insured's activities were
considered nonintentional under the provisions of the policy's "inten-
tional act" clause, and then turn around and deny that subrogated
insurer the right of contribution on the ground that the injury or
wrongful death was "intentionally caused" within the definition of the
Act.
The liability policies most likely to be encountered are the Family
Combination Automobile Policy, the Homeowners Policy, and the
Comprehensive General Liability-Automobile Policy.5 2  Although the
language of the "intentional act" clauses in each of these policies
differs somewhat,5 3 the interpretation given to each is about the
same. 54  Because the "intentional act" clause of the Family Com-
bination Automobile Policy has been the recipient of the most recent
judicial scrutiny, and because its language is most like that of the Act,
it may be used for the purposes of illustration. Thus:
51 As it is said in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(C) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)):
A liability insurer, which by payment has discharged in full or in part the liability
of a tortfeasor and has thereby discharged in full its obligation as insurer, is sub-
rogated to the tortfeasor's right of contribution to the extent of the amount it has
paid in excess of the tortfeasor's proportionate share of the common liability.
This provision does not limit or impair any right of subrogation arising from any
other relationship.
52 The Personal Injury Liability Insurance coverage in the Comprehensive General
Liability-Automobile Policy presents some unique problems because it provides liability
coverage for false arrest, detention, or imprisonment; malicious prosecution; libel, slander,
and other defamation; violation of the right of privacy; wrongful entry or eviction; and
other invasions of the right of private occupancy - offenses which are generally consid-
ered to be intentional torts. See notes 6-11 and accompanying text supra.
- The standard Family Combination Automobile Policy provides:
This policy does not apply under Part I to bodily injury or property damage
caused intentionally by or at the direction of the insured.
The standard Homeowners Policy states:
This policy does not apply to bodily injury or property damage which is either
expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.
The standard Comprehensive General Liability-Automobile Policy provides coverage
on an occurrence basis, defining occurrence as follows:
"Occurrence" means an accident, including continuous or repeated exlposure to
conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected
nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.
54 Compare Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 41 Ohio App. 2d 113, 322 N.E.2d 693 (1974)
("bodily injury ... caused intentionally by ... the insured") and Sykes v. Midwestern
Indem. Co., 38 Ohio Misc. 64, 311 N.E.2d 906 (Cuy. Cty. C.P. 1973) ("Property Damage
... caused intentionally by ... the insured") withl Mnurray v. Landenberger, 5 Ohio
App. 2d 294, 215 N.E.2d 412 (1966) ("caused by accident"). See also Celina Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Saylor, 35 Ohio Misc. 81, 301 N.E.2d 721 (Hamilton Cty. C.P. 1973) for the proper
meaning of "expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured."
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FAMILY COMBINATION Section 2307.31(A):
AUTOMOBILE POLICY:
This policy does not apply There is no right of contribu-
under Part I to bodily injury tion in favor of any tortfeasor
or property damage caused who has intentionally caused
intentionally by or at the or intentionally contributed
direction of the insured. to the injury or wrongful
death. 55
Most of the recent decisions which have interpreted this or like lan-
guage have drawn a distinction between an intentional injury and an
intentional act which produces an injury.5 6 In order to be within the
language of the exclusion, the bodily injury or property damage must
itself be intended by the insured; it is not enough that the insured in-
tentionally committed the act which produced the bodily injury or
property damage. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Mosley57 is illustrative.
While driving through Ripley, Ohio, Mosley observed Germann talking
to Mosley's boyfriend. Jealous, Mosley turned her car around and
drove it into a parking lot with the intention of hitting Germann.
She missed Germann, and struck Maynard, who unfortunately found
himself in the path of the car. Maynard sued Mosley, alleging that
Mosley had driven off the highway striking and injuring him without
characterizing Mosley's conduct as either "intentional" or "negligent."
Mosley's insurer brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a
declaration that coverage for Maynard's bodily injury was precluded
by the "intentional act" clause of the policy which excluded coverage
for "bodily injury . .. caused intentionally by . . . the insured.."58
The trial court granted judgment for the insurer, but the court of appeals
reversed noting that:
To deny coverage here, we would be required to judicially amend
the provision to read: "Bodily injury caused by intentional ac-
tions of the insured."5 9
Although it is true that exclusions in insurance policies are to be
strictly construed, 60 it is equally true that remedial statutes are to be
liberally construed, 61 so the effect is about the same. Thus, it may be
concluded that the right of contribution is not defeated unless the tort-
55 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(A) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)).
5' Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 41 Ohio App. 2d 113, 322 N.E.2d 693 (1974); Sykes v.
Midwestern Indem. Co., 38 Ohio Misc. 64, 311 N.E.2d 906 (Cuy. Cty. C.P. 1973); Murray
v. Landenberger, 5 Ohio App. 2d 294, 215 N.E.2d 412 (1966).
17 41 Ohio App. 2d 113, 322 N.E.2d 693 (1974).
Although such an action appeared proper at the time it was brought, it is now clear
that to the extent that the insurance company seeks to avoid its duty to defend by such a
declaratory judgment, it does not have a claim upon which relief can be granted. See
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Pildner, 40 Ohio St. 2d 101, 321 N.E.2d 600 (1974); Browne,
The Demise of the Declaratory Judgment Action as a Device for Testing the Insurer's
Duty to Defend: A Postscript, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 18 (1975).
9 41 Ohio App. 2d 113, 115-17, 322 N.E.2d 693, 695-96 (1974).
60 Id. at 115-16, 322 N.E.2d at 695-96.
I See note 10 supra.
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feasor specifically intended the injury or wrongful death which gave
rise to his or her liability.
There remains the problem of determining where wilful or wanton
misconduct fits into the statutory scheme. The two terms have been
so often conjoined in the phrase "wilful and wanton misconduct" that
the fact that the terms stand for separate and distinct concepts has
been obscured; in fact the two concepts are said to be antagonistic. 2
In order to establish wantonness, the conduct must demonstrate a
disposition to perversity, such as acts of stubbornness, obstinacy, or
persistency in opposing that which is reasonable, correct, or generally
accepted as a proper course to follow in protecting the safety of others.
The tortfeasor's conduct must be found to have been under such cir-
cumstances and existing conditions that he or she must have been
conscious that his or her conduct would, in all probability, result in
injury.63 Such misconduct, perverse though it may be, involves some-
thing less than a specific intent to cause injury or death. 64  Accord-
ingly, a tortfeasor who is found guilty of wanton misconduct cannot be
deprived of a right to contribution on the ground that he or she has
"intentionally caused or intentionally contributed to the injury or
wrongful death" of the claimant. This raises another question: a find-
ing of wanton misconduct may also carry with it an award of punitive
damages. 65  The Act does not distinguish between punitive damages
and compensatory damages; it merely speaks of "liability." In its
broadest sense, "liability" could include liability for punitive damages.
But since punitive damages are intended as punishment for reprehensi-
ble conduct, 6 it would be inconsistent with the concept of punish-
ment to permit the wanton tortfeasor to "lay off" part of his or her
punishment on another by way of contribution. Therefore, the better
interpretation is that contribution extends to compensatory damages
only, and does not include punitive damages. It follows then, that the
term "liability" as used in the Act means liability for compensatory
damages.
62 Red Star Yeast & Prod. Co. v. Engel, 21 Ohio L. Abs. 537, 542 (Ct. App. 1935):
It thus appears from the latest decision of the Supreme Court that the terms "wil-
ful tort" and "wanton negligence" are not synonymous, but that they are antago-
nistic in meaning, one implying a design or purpose and the other the absence of
such design and the failure to exercise any care.
a Roszman v. Sammett, 26 Ohio St. 2d 94, 97, 269 N.E.2d 420, 422-23 (1971).
64 Universal Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567, 575, 200 N.E. 843, 847
(1936) quoting 20 RULING CASE LAW, Negligence § 15 (1918):
[T]o constitute wanton negligence, the party doing the act or failing to act must
be conscious, of his conduct, and, though having no intent to injure, must be con-
scious, from his knowledge of surrounding circumstances and existing condi-
tions, that his conduct will naturally or probably result in injury.
(Emphasis added.) See Tighe v. Diamond, 149 Ohio St. 520, 80 N.E.2d 122 (1948).
65 Universal Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567, 572, 200 N.E. 843, 845
(19,36):
That is not the only "wallop" that the little word "wanton" carries with it. It
permits, in addition to compensatory damages, the assessment of punitive dam-
ages - damages by way of punishment, if you please . . ..
66 Id.
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Wilful misconduct, on the other hand, imports a more positive men-
tal condition prompting an act than does the term wanton misconduct.
Wilful misconduct implies an intentional deviation from a clear and ac-
cepted standard of conduct. The phrase implies intent, but the inten-
tion relates to the misconduct and not merely to the fact that the act was
intentionally done. While wilful misconduct encompasses wilful torts,
or intent to cause injury, an actual intent to injure is not necessary to a
showing of wilful misconduct.6 7  Thus, if we are correct in concluding
that the right of contribution will not be defeated unless a specific in-
tent to cause injury or death is shown, a mere finding that a tortfeasor
is guilty of wilful misconduct will not preclude contribution because such
a finding does not necessarily import the requisite specific intent. It
may, but it need not; and because it need not, something more in the
way of proof will be required. Accordingly, when the wilful miscon-
duct of one or more of the tortfeasors is at issue, the jury's answers to
interrogatories, or the court's findings of fact become all-important.,
In sum, then, a tortfeasor's right to contribution will not be defeated
under this exception unless the tortfeasor is liable for a wilful tort, since
only a wilful tort involves design, purpose, or intent to injure. 69 The
term wilful tort is not synonymous with wanton misconduct or wilful
misconduct; wanton misconduct never amounts to a wilful tort, and wil-
ful misconduct will not, unless a specific design, purpose, or intent to
injure accompanies the wilful misconduct. 70
The second direct exception from contribution, as stated in the Act,
excludes "breaches of trust or of other fiduciary obligations. '' 7I The
conjunction of the word "trust" with the phrase "or of other fiduciary
obligations" indicates that the word is to be understood in its broadest
sense rather than in the narrow, technical meaning of an express trust.
Thus, it would not only comprehend a breach of an express trust, but
also a breach of a resulting trust or a constructive trust. Indeed, until
we are told otherwise by an authoritative decision, we may assume that
this exception is intended to reach every relationship which a court of
equity would consider to be fiduciary in nature; that is, it is intended
to reach every relationship in which one person reposes trust and con-
fidence in the integrity and fidelity of another. At the very least, the
word "fiduciary" is intended to include those persons who qualify as
fiduciaries under any particular statutory definition of that word.7 2
17 Tighe v. Diamond, 149 Ohio St. 520, 526-27, 80 N.E.2d 122, 127 (1948).
68 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.32(E) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)) provides that:
[V]alid answers to interrogatories by a jury or findings by a court sitting without
a jury in determining the liability of the several defendants for an injury or wrong-
ful death shall be binding as among such defendants in determining their right to
contribution.
9 Tighe v. Diamond, 149 Ohio St. 520, 525, 80 N.E.2d 122, 126 (1948); Denzer v.
Terpstra, 129 Ohio St. 1, 193 N.E. 647 (1934); Reserve Trucking Co. v. Fairchild, 128
Ohio St. 519, 191 N.E. 745 (1934).
10 Tighe v. Diamond, 149 Ohio St. 520, 525, 80 N.E.2d 122, 126 (1948).
7' Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(E) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)).
72 Id. §§ 1339.01(A), 1339.03(B) (Page 1969); id. § 2109.01 (Page 1972).
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The previous discussion of Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Trowbridge7 3
touched upon the indirect exception - indemnity.74  But when does a
tortfeasor have a right of indemnity under "existing law?" If the phrase
contemplates existing statutory law, in this connection, several sections
of the Ohio Revised Code come immediately to mind.75  One, in
particular, can be of major importance. In very broad terms, this pro-
vision waives the sovereign immunity of hospitals owned or operated by
political subdivisions of the State of Ohio, and authorizes the governing
board of each such hospital to indemnify or agree to indemnify and hold
harmless any of the hospital's agents, employees, nurses, interns, resi-
dents, staff, and members of the governing board and committees for
any liability they may incur for the death, disease, or injury of any per-
son caused by their negligence, malpractice, or other action or inaction
while they were acting within the scope of their duties for the hospital.7 6
Since the sovereign immunity of the hospital has been waived, since the
liability of the agent is tortious in nature, and since his or her liability
must arise out of tortious acts performed within the scope of his or her
duties for the hospital, it may be assumed that the hospital itself would
be liable in tort under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Since the
indemnity arises out of the joint or several liability in tort of the hospital
and its agent for the same injury to the person or for the same wrongful
death, the basic requisites for contribution are also satisfied. This
would appear to be a situation when indemnity is provided for "under
existing law."
However, this alone does not necessarily preclude contribution under
the Act. For section 2307.31(D) to be applicable there must be a right
of indemnity "under existing law." This statutory enactment does not of
itself confer upon the hospital's agent any right to indemnity; it merely
provides that the hospital, through its governing board, may indemnify,
or may agree to indemnify the hospital's agents, employees, nurses, etc.
if the governing board considers it appropriate to do so. In other words,
the statute permits the governing board of the hospital, in the exercise
of its sound discretion, to: grant indemnity on an ad hoc basis after liabil-
ity has been incurred by the agent; agree to indemnify the agent after
liability has been incurred; or enter into an agreement for indemnity with
its agents before liability is incurred. If indemnity is granted on an ad hoc
13 41 Ohio St. 2d 11, 321 N.E.2d 787 (1975). See text accompanying notes 29-35
supra.
,4 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(D) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)) which provides:
This section does not impair any right of indemnity under existing law. Where
one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the right of the indemnity
obligee is for indemnity and not contribution ...
,5 The first provides a surety with a right of action for indemnity against his or her
principal under certain conditions. Id. § 1341.20 (Page 1969). However, since the prin-
cipal's liability to the surety arises out of the contractual relationship between them, and
not out of their joint or several liability in tort to the claimant-creditor, this provision
has no particular relevance here. The second and third have to do with indemnity in
conjunction with letters of credit. Id. §§ 1305.12, 1305.16. Again, the right to in-
demnity does not arise out of joint or several liability in tort, so these provisions are
not pertinent.
16 Id. § 2743.02 (Page Supp. 1975).
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basis after liability has been incurred, it is granted as a matter of grace
rather than as a matter of right; if it is granted pursuant to agreement
either before or after liability has been incurred, there is a right to in-
demnity, but this is a right arising out of a contractual agreement made
pursuant to the statute rather than out of the statute itself. These con-
siderations provoke two questions: (1) what effect does gracious indemnity
have on the right to contribution, and (2) what effect does a contractual
right to indemnity have on contribution? In answering both questions, it
is assumed that in the absence of indemnity there would be a right to
contribution under the Act.
The answer to the first question is suggested by the second sentence
of section 2307.31(D): "Where one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity
from another, the right of the indemnity obligee is for indemnity and
not contribution, . . ."7 Where indemnity is granted as a matter of
grace, the hospital's tortfeasing agent has neither a right nor an entitle-
ment to indemnity. 78  Thus, until the indemnity is actually paid by the
hospital, the agent has a right to contribution. Once indemnity has been
paid, it would seem that the right to contribution ceases to exist, not
because of any right to indemnity, but because the claim for contribu-
tion has been satisfied by the payment of indemnity. The right to con-
tribution is governed by the principles of equity,79 and equity will not
permit the recovery of both indemnity and contribution.
The second question actually goes beyond the situation involving
the hospital and its agents. Any number of agreements contain provi-
sions whereby one party agrees to indemnify the other for certain types
of liability. For the sake of convenience, we may call these provisions
"express contracts of indemnity." The precise scope and thrust of each
such contract will depend upon the language used and the rigidity with
which a court will apply the principle that such contracts are to be nar-
rowly construed.8 0  For our purposes, we shall assume a valid express
contract of indemnity in which one tortfeasor jointly or severally liable
for an injury or wrongful death agrees to indemnify another tortfeasor
for that other tortfeasor's joint or several liability for the same injury or
wrongful death. Thus, we have a right of indemnity arising out of an
express contract, and the second question becomes: Does the phrase
"existing law" include the law of contracts?
Again, the answer is suggested by the second sentence of the section:
"Where one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the right of
the indemnity obligee is for indemnity and not contribution ... ,,s8
77 Id. § 2307.31(D) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)) (emphasis added).
71 Of course, the equitable principle of estoppel may give the hospital's agent a right
to indemnity if he or she forbears to exercise the right to contribution on the hospital's
gratuitous promise to pay indemnity, but that is a matter that is not directly relevant to
the meaning of the indemnity exception in the Act.
71 As it is said in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(F) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)),
"principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply."
10 George H. Dingledy Lumber Co. v. Erie R.R. Co., 102 Ohio St. 236, 131 N.E. 723
(1921).
s1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(D) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)).
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The thrust of this clause is to the effect that a legally recognized right
or entitlement to indemnity will not be defeated by the statutorily
created right of contribution. Whether the right or entitlement gains its
legal cognizance from the statutory law or the law of contracts appears
insignificant. In other words, the phrase "existing law" should be given
a broad, rather than a narrow, construction embracing all legally rec-
ognized rights of indemnity.
Accordingly, section 2307.31(D) should also extend to rights or en-
titlements to indemnity under the common law - that is, rights or entitle-
ments to indemnity created by judicial decision rather than by statute or
by express contract.82 Generally, the common law recognizes three sit-
uations in which one tortfeasor who has satisfied his or her liability to
the claimant has a right to seek indemnity from another tortfeasor.8
3
(1) When one person is held vicariously liable to the claimant for
the tortious acts of another solely because of the relationship between
them, the one vicariously liable may seek indemnity from the one whose
active wrong gave rise to that liability. The master-servant relationship
is a good example of this situation. When a master is thus held liable
to the claimant on the basis of respondeat superior, he or she may seek
indemnity from the servant.
(2) When two truly concurrent tortfeasors share a common duty to-
ward the injured party, or combine in some form to achieve a common pur-
pose affecting the injured party, the tortfeasor who did not participate
12 One might quarrel with the characterization of this right to indemnity as a common
law right, since it is said that this right arises out of an implied contract of indemnity.
See, e.g., paragraph 2 of the syllabus of Maryland Cas. Co. v. Frederick Co., 142 Ohio
St. 605, 53 N.E.2d 795 (1944):
Where judgment in a tort action is had against a party only secondarily or vicari-
ously liable for the violation of a common duty owed by two persons, upon the
payment of such judgment and necessary expenses by such party, there arises
an implied contract of indemnity in favor of the party secondarily liable against
the person (or persons) primarily liable.
However, it is also said that the right to indemnity arises out of legal (as opposed to con-
ventional) subrogation. As paragraph 1 of the syllabus of Losito v. Kruse, 136 Ohio St.
183, 24 N.E.2d 705 (1940), states:
When, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master becomes liable in
damages for personal injuries caused solely by the negligent act of his servant,
the latter is primarily liable and the former secondarily liable to the injured party;
and if the master is obliged to respond in damages by reason of such liability, he
will be subrogated to the right of the injured party and may recover his loss from
the servant, the one primarily liable.
See also Hillyer v. City of East Cleveland, 155 Ohio St. 552, 99 N.E.2d 772 (1951);
Herron v. City of Youngstown, 136 Ohio St. 190, 24 N.E.2d 708 (1940), which are similar
on their facts to the Maryland Casualty Co. case.
Since it is not our purpose here to attempt to rationalize the two theories or to deter-
mine when one applies, and when the other, it is convenient to group them both under the
heading of common law theories of indemnity. In the final analysis, it does not matter
which theory is the better of the two, since both the contract implied in law and legal
subrogation are governed by the same equitable principles of restitution and unjust en-
richment. See D. DoBEs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMEDIEs 222 (1973); R. HORN,
SUBROGATION IN INSURANCE THEORY AND PRACrICE 24 (1964).
83 The first two situations, and the various factual permutations which arise there-
under, are discussed in some detail in Cochran v. B. & 0. R.R., 41 Ohio App. 2d 186, 324
N.E.2d 759 (1974). To date, the sole authority for the third situation appears to be
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Trowbridge, 41 Ohio St. 2d 11, 321 N.E.2d 787 (1975).
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol25/iss2/3
CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS
in the act or omission causing the injury, or whose participation is in-
direct, implied, or remote, is only secondarily liable to the injured party,
and may seek indemnity from the other tortfeasor who is primarily li-
able. This relationship between concurrent tortfeasors is most commonly
described as primary and secondary, or active and passive.
(3) When the first of two successive tortfeasors is liable in tort for
the intervening tortious acts of the second tortfeasor because those inter-
vening acts were set in motion by the negligence of the first tortfeasor,
the first tortfeasor may seek indemnity from the second tortfeasor for
the subsequent injury. At the present time, case authority supports
this right to indemnity only when the second tortfeasor is a physician
who, in treating the first injury caused by the original tortfeasor negli-
gently causes a new injury or aggravates the existing injury.8 4  In
principle, however, it is capable of extension to other like fact situations.
When one tortfeasor severally liable for injury or wrongful death has
a right, under any one of these three common law situations, to seek
indemnity from another tortfeasor severally liable for the same injury
or wrongful death, the "right of the indemnity obligee is for indemnity
and not contribution.."8 5
Particularly in connection with the "primary and secondary" situation,
Ohio Revised Code section 2305.31 presents a problem. In substance,
that statute prohibits express contracts of indemnity in connection with,
or collateral to, construction contracts.8 6 However, while it declares
void as against public policy those express contracts which purport to
indemnify for bodily injury to persons or damage to property, it says
nothing about wrongful death unless it can be said that wrongful death
is subsumed in the phrase "damages arising out of bodily injury."
Further, the precise scope of the prohibition contained in the statute
is not entirely clear from the language used, but the principal thrust of
section 2305.31 appears to be the indemnitee's liability for bodily
injury or property damage caused by negligence during construction.
Broadly speaking, the indemnitee's liability may be one of three types.
First, there may be liability for the indemnitee's own negligence which
causes the bodily injury or property damage. There may be liability for
negligently caused bodily injury or property damage which the indemnitee
s1 Travelers Indem. Co. v. Trowbridge, 41 Ohio St. 2d 11, 321 N.E.2d 787 (1975).
8- OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(D) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)).
58 Id. § 2305.31 (Page Supp. 1975) reads:
A covenant, promise, agreement, or understanding in, or in connection with or
collateral to, a contract or agreement relative to the design, planning, construc-
tion, alteration, repair, or maintenance of a building, structure, highway, road,
appurtenance, and appliance, including moving, demolition, and excavating con-
nected therewith, pursuant to which contract or agreement the promisee, or its
independent contractors, agents or employees has hired the promisor to perform
work, purporting to indemnify the promisee, its independent contractors, agents,
employees, or indemnitees against liability for damages arising out of bodily
injury to persons or damage to property initiated or proximately caused by or re-
sulting from the negligence of the promisee, its independent contractors, agents,
employees, or indemnitees is against public policy and is void. Nothing in this
section shall prohibit any person from purchasing insurance from an insurance
company authorized to do business in the state of Ohio for his own protection
or from purchasing a construction bond.
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shares, either jointly or severally, with the indemnitor . 7  And thirdly,
vicarious liability for bodily injury or property damage negligently
caused by the indemnitor, which is imposed upon the indemnitee be-
cause of the indemnitee's legal relationship with the indernnitor s8
The preferable reading of the statute would have it apply only to the
first type of liability - that is, express contracts of indemnity which pur-
port to indemnify the indemnitee for any liability arising solely out of the
indemnitee's own negligence or other wrong are void as against public
policy. The statute may be read, however, to extend its prohibition to
the second type of liability as well, and with some strain, it can also
be made to apply to the third type of liability. For our purpose here
we shall assume that it at least extends to both the first and second types
of liability.
Now, let us suppose that a subcontractor expressly contracts to in-
demnify the contractor for any and all liability for negligently caused
bodily injury or property damage occurring during the construction of a
building. Through the concurrent negligence of each, a third person not
employed by either is injured. In the event, the subcontractor-indemni-
tor is primarily liable while the contractor indemnitee is only secondarily
liable, the contractor-indemnitee has no claim for indemnity under the
express contract since that contract is void as against public policy.
Would he have a claim for indemnity under the second common law
situation described above?
Probably not. The theory is that common law indemnity arises out
of either a contract implied in law or legal subrogation. The law will
scarcely imply a contract when an express contract covering the same
matter would be void as against public policy; and, since "equity fol-
lows the law," equity will scarcely assign a claim under the doctrine of
subrogation where public policy would prohibit an express assignment.
Therefore, it may be concluded that there is no common law right to
indemnity where there cannot be an express contract for indemnity.
But how does this affect contribution? The equitable principles of
restitution and unjust enrichment which underlie and justify indemnity
are essentially the same as those which underlie contribution. s9 In-
87 In this situation, the indemnitee and the indemnitor may be coequally negligent,
or one may be primarily and the other secondarily negligent.
s For example, the liability of an employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior
for the acts of an employee or an independent contractor.
89 In Travelers Indem. Co. v. Trowbridge, 41 Ohio St. 2d 11, 13-14, 321 N.E.2d 787,
789 (1975) the court said:
Although the two forms of reimbursement are similar, there is a distinct differ-
ence. Contribution, when it exists, is the right of a person who has been com-
pelled to pay what another should pay in part to require partial (usually propor-
tionate) reimbursement and arises from principles of equity and natural jlstice.
Indemnity, on the other hand, arises from contract, express or implied, a.-;d is a
right of a person who has been compelled to pay what another should pay in full
to require complete reimbursement.
(Citations omitted.) At first blush this quotation may appear to refute the statement
made in the text, but this is not really so, for it begs the question. It fails to examine the
nature of the implied contract which requires indemnity. Motivated by the same prin-
ciples of equity and natural justice, the law implies a contract of indemnity.
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demnity and contribution are identical in quality, if not in quantity; in-
deed, quantity is the principal difference between them. 0 Thus, it
would seem that if it is contrary to public policy to imply a contract of
indemnity or to permit subrogation, it would also be contrary to public
policy to permit contribution. On the other hand, both section 2307.31
and section 2305.31 are statutory expressions of the public policy of the
State of Ohio. Since the statute providing for contribution is more re-
cent, and since it does not prohibit contribution in the situation covered
by section 2305.31, it can be argued that in such a situation contribu-
tion is not contrary to public policy. Such a result is not necessarily
inconsistent in law. 91 Of course, if the courts limit the prohibition found
in section 2305.31 to those situations in which the indemnitee is seeking
indemnity for his or her own negligence, the problem is resolved, since
such a situation will justify neither subrogation, an implied contract of
indemnity, nor a right to contribution under section 2307.31.
In any event, indemnity is only a indirect exception to the right of
contribution because it precludes the exercise of that right only in prac-
tice, and not in theory. The whole thrust of section 2307.31(D) is to
the effect that the new statutory right to contribution does not impair an
existing right to indemnity. Thus, if a tortfeasor has a right to indemnity
"under existing law," and a right to contribution under the terms of the
Act, he or she may choose between them, and exercise either right, but
not both. As a practical matter, of course, the tortfeasor will choose
indemnity since that will normally bring the greater monetary return.92
Accordingly, the right to indemnity - as a practical matter - indirectly
precludes the exercise of the right to contribution.
In one sense, however, indemnity absolutely precludes the exercise
of the right of contribution. As it is noted in the last clause of section
2307.31(D):
[T]he indemnity obligor is not entitled to contribution from the
obligee for any portion of his indemnity obligation.93
This presupposes that the two tortfeasors have rights to contribution
against each other depending upon which of them satisfies the total lia-
bility to the claimant, and that the tortfeasor who has satisfied that
liability, the indemnitee, has a valid claim for indemnity against the
other, the indemnitor. When such a claim is made, the indemnitor
cannot offset against it that amount which would be his or hers under
90 Travelers Indem. Co. v. Trowbridge, 41 Ohio St. 2d 11, 321 N.E.2d 787 (1975).
Contribution provides for only partial reimbursement, while indemnity allows for total
reimbursement. Therefore, the difference is one of quantity rather than quality.
"1 As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., once said:
It is something to show that the consistency of a system requires a particular re-
sult, but it is not all. The life of the law has not been logic: It has been experi-
ence. . . . The truth is, that the law is always approaching, and never reaching
consistency. . . . It will become entirely consistent only when it ceases to grow.
0. HoLMEs, JR., THE COMMON LAW 36 (1881).
92 Travelers Indem. Co. v. Trowbridge, 41 Ohio St. 2d 11, 13-14, 321 N.E.2d 787, 788
(1975).
93 OHzo REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(D) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)).
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the right of contribution. In other words, in such a situation, the tort-
feasor-indemnitor is going to wind up paying to the tortfeasor-indemnitee
more than the tortfeasor-indemnitor's proportionate share of the total
liability and, because the Act "does not impair any right of indemnity,"
he or she will not be able to recoup by way of contribution the amount
paid in excess of his or her proportionate share.
D. Payment by the Tortfeasor Seeking Contribution
The next essential element of the right of contribution is that pay-
ment must have been made to the claimant by the tortfeasor seeking
contribution. The right to contribution does not arise until payment
has been made by the tortfeasor of "more than his proportionate share
of the common liability. '9 4 This does not mean that the tortfeasor may
not seek contribution from other tortfeasors until after he or she has
made payment to the claimant. It merely means that he or she has no
right to receive contribution until that payment has been made. Pro-
cedural devices exist which permit the acceleration of a judicial deter-
mination as to the right of contribution. The cross-claim9 5 and the third
party claim 98 are two such devices which permit one tortfeasor to seek
a judicial declaration of the right to contribution from another tortfeasor
before he or she has actually made payment to the claimant.
Of course, the tortfeasor need not make the payment personally; any
person having an obligation to do so may make the payment on the tort-
feasor's behalf.97 In the vast majority of cases, the person so making
payment on behalf of the tortfeasor will be that tortfeasor's liability
carrier, but it need not be. The language of the Act9" is broad enough
to encompass any person who has an obligation to make payment for
the tortfeasor. When a liability carrier makes payment, its obligation to do
so can almost be assumed, since insurance companies are noticeably
loathe to make payments that are not required of them; but when the
person is someone other than a liability carrier, his or her obligation to
make payment will become a matter of importance demanding inquiry
by any other tortfeasor who may be subject to a claim for contribution.
A person who makes payment on behalf of a tortfeasor under obligation
will be subrogated to the tortfeasor's 99 right of contribution if that per-
94 Id. § 2307.31(A).
'- OHIo R. Civ. P. 13(G).
96 Id. 14(A).
" This is a necessary inference from the language of Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(C)
(Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)).
" Id. § 2307.31(C) speaks mostly of an insurance carrier's right of subrogation, but
the section closes with the sentence: "This provision does not limit or impair an.y right of
subrogation arising from any other relationship." From this it may reasonably be in-
ferred that obligatory payments made on behalf of the tortfeasor by someone other than
an insurer will also give rise to subrogation if the law otherwise requires it.
99 This is actually the result of a double subrogation. To the extent that a tortfeasor
pays more than his or her proportionate share of the liability to the claimant, he or she
has paid on behalf of the other tortfeasor. To that extent, the paying tortfeasor is sub-
rogated to the claimant's claim against the non-paying tortfeasor. But since, in this situ-
ation, it is the paying tortfeasor's liability insurer that is actually making the payment to
[Vol. 25:151
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son thereby: (1) discharges the tortfeasor's liability to the claimant in
full or in part, (2) discharges in full its obligation to the tortfeasor, and
(3) pays to the claimant more than the tortfeasor's proportionate share
of the common liability. 00 It should be noted, however, that one who
makes payment on behalf of the tortfeasor without any obligation to do
so is a mere volunteer with no right of subrogation,10' and consequently,
no right to contribution. Voluntary payment is, therefore, an affirma-
tive defense to a claim for contribution by one other than the tortfeasor
who has made payment to the claimant and is seeking contribution from
another tortfeasor.
E. Calculation of the Amount of Contribution
Section 2307.31(A) juxtaposes two principles with respect to the pay-
ment of contribution. The first limits the amount of contribution which
the paying tortfeasor may seek to that amount which he or she has paid
in excess of his or her proportionate share of the common liability.1
02
The complimentary principle is that the non-paying tortfeasor is only re-
quired to pay by way of contribution to the paying tortfeasor his or her
proportionate share of the common liability.1°3
Thus, for example, if there are three tortfeasors who are all equally
at fault for the injury to the claimant, the proportionate share of each is
one-third. If the total amount of the common liability is $33,000, each
is theoretically liable for $11,000. Should one of the three pay the full
$33,000, he or she is entitled to seek $22,000 from the other two, but
neither of the other two need pay more than $11,000 - his or her pro-
portionate share of the whole. Accordingly, if the paying tortfeasor
wishes to obtain full reimbursement for the $22,000 which he or she has
paid in excess of his or her proportionate share, contribution must be
sought from both of the non-paying tortfeasors.
Central to both of these principles limiting contribution is the con-
cept of "proportionate share." How is the proportionate share of each
tortfeasor to be determined? Overall, the principles of equity applicable
the claimant, the liability insurer becomes subrogated to the claim which the tortfeasor
obtained by subrogation from the claimant. Thus, in the final analysis, the "tortfeasor's
right of contribution" to which the insurance company has become subrogated is actually
the claimant's claim; a claim which has passed to the insurance company by means of
double subrogation.
,00 As Ofuo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(C) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)) provides in
part:
A liability insurer which by payment has discharged in full or in part the liability
of a tortfeasor and has thereby discharged in full its obligation as insurer, is sub-
rogated to the tortfeasor's right of contribution to the extent of the amount it has
paid in excess of the tortfeasor's proportionate share of the common liability.
"15 50 OnxO JuR. 2d Subrogation § 10 (1961).
102 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(A) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)) provides:
The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more
than his proportionatd share of the common liability, and his total recovery is
limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his proportionate share.
103 Id.
No tortfeasor is compelled to make contribution beyond his own proportionate
share of the entire liability.
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to contribution generally will apply,104 except as otherwise provided in
the Act itself.10 5  As a general proposition, equity follows the maxim
that "equality is equity," and holds that each tortfeasor must bear an
equal share of the common liability. Thus, if there are two tortfeasors,
the proportionate share of each is one-half; if there are three, the pro-
portionate share of each is one-third, etc. This approach may be de-
scribed as the "principle of equal fault." A majority of states allowing
contribution take this apprach,'10 6 as does the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act. 107 The Ohio Act, however, rejects this approach,
and substitutes the "principle of comparative fault" for the "principle of
equal fault."'0 8
In theory, the principle of comparative fault will produce a more
equitable result than will the principle of equal fault. In practice, how-
ever, this equity is apt to get lost in the difficulties of proof and in the
shuffle of guesswork in which the trier of fact must necessarily indulge.
The difference between the two approaches can be illustrated by some
reflections on the problem of proof. Suppose that two tortfeasors share
a common liability to a claimant in the amount of $10,000, and that
one of them has paid the claimant the full $10,000. Broadly speaking,
under the principle of equal fault the paying tortfeasor seeking contri-
bution from the non-paying tortfeasor need only prove the common
liability and his or her payment of that liability. The presumption of
equal shares would then arise and the proportionate share of each would
be determined by dividing the amount of damages paid by the number of
tortfeasors. Thus, the principle of equal fault automatically determines
that the share of each tortfeasor is $5,000; that the paying tortfeasor
has paid $5,000 more than his or her proportionate share; and that the
non-paying tortfeasor is liable in contrbution to the paying tortfeasor
in the amount of $5,000.
But no such presumption will arise under the principle of compara-
tive fault as found in the Ohio Act. This simple calculation will not
be available. Rather, it would seem that the paying Ohio tortfeasor
must prove the common liability, payment of that liability, his or her
own percentage of fault, and the percentage of fault attributable to the
non-paying tortfeasor. In short, the tortfeasor seeking contribution will
be required to resort to those techniques of proof that have been devel-
oped in states which have replaced contributory negligence with com-
parative negligence; techniques which are far from scientific or fool-
104 Id. § 2307.31(F).
105 Id. § 230.31(A).
106 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 50 (4th ed. 1971).
107 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 87
(1975) states:
In determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability (a) their
relative degrees of fault shall not be considered.
108 Otuo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(F) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)) provides in part:
in determining the proportionate shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability their
relative degrees of fault shall be considered.
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proof.10 Further, should all of the tortfeasors be joined as defendants
in the claimant's action, each will seek to take advantage of the jury's
answers to interrogatories since such answers will be binding for pur-
poses of contribution."" Accordingly, in any given case, the issues to be
determined by the jury may include the contributory negligence of the
claimant as between the claimant and the defendants, and the compara-
tive negligence of the defendants as between themselves. The jury
will have to be instructed on the application of both of these complex
doctrines. That should keep the appellate courts busyl
To compound tne confusion, not every tortfeasor liable in contribu-
tion will have a full share of the common liability. Since section
2307.31(F) provides that when a group is collectively liable the group
as a whole is responsible for their share, in certain cases, some tort-
feasors will be liable for only a proportionate share of a share."' For
example, a claimant is injured in the amount of $15,000 through the
concurrent negligence of a motorist and a truck driver acting in the course
and scope of his employment. The claimant sues the motorist, the truck
driver, and tle truck driver's employer obtaining several judgments
against each. The moronst pays the full $15,000, and seeks contribution
from the truck driver and the truck driver's employer. If we suppose
that the motorist and the truck driver were equally at fault, the motorist
would argue that his proportionate share is one-third, or $5,000, and
that he is entitled to contribution in the amount of $10,000 from the
truck driver and the truck driver's employer, with each being liable in
contrioution for $5,000, or one-third of the common liability.
but in this situation, there are only two tortfeasors, not three; the
liability of the truck driver's employer is not real liability, but liability
imposed oy operation of law. The truck driver's employer is not a real
tortfeasor in the sense of being guilty of some act of omission or
commission whiich caused the claimant's injury. Accordingly, the truck
driver's empioyer should not be made to bear a separate share, for if he
must, the motorist would bear less than his true share of the common
liability, and would have to pay only $5,000 rather than the $7,500
which nAe should pay.
In the case of Martindale v. Griffin with facts similar to those of
109 See C. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL (1971); L. LAUFENBERG, COMPARA-
TIVe NEGLIGENCE 'RIMER (1975); V. SCHWARTz COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974).
1c tis it is said in Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.32(E) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)):
Valid answers to interrogatories by a jury or findings by a court sitting without a
jury in determining tne liability of the several defendants for an injury or wrongful
deach shall be binding as among such defendants in determining their right to
contribution.
HI Id. § 2307.31(F). UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, 12 UNIFORM
LAws ANNOTATED 87, Comment (1975) states:
This section . . . invokes the rule of equity which requires class liability arising
from vicarious relationships to be treated as a single share. For instance, the
liobility of a master and servant for the wrong of the servant should in fairness
be treated as a single share. Other examples are those situations involving co-
owners of property, members of an unincorporated association, those engaged
in a joint enterprise and the like; where the problem is the allocation of liability
between such a group on the one hand and a tortfeasor having no connection
with the group.
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the above example, the court distinguished between one who was "a
direct participator in the wrong, and one who is liable only because he
is responsible for the acts of one of said participators." l 2 That court
held that there were really only two, not three, joint tortfeasors.
Therefore, in situations such as this, where the liability of one tort-
feasor is purely vicarious, that tortfeasor will not be made to bear a
separate share of the common liability; rather, he or she will be grouped
with the tortfeasor whose active wrong gave rise to the vicarious liabil-
ity, and the two will bear a single separate share of the common liability
as a group. Accordingly, in our example, there are but two shares in the
common liability rather than three; the share of the motorist and the
share of the group consisting of the truck driver and the truck driver's
employer. Since we stipulated that the motorist and the truck driver were
equally at fault, each share will be one-half of the whole, and the motor-
ist will be entitled to contribution in the amount of $7,500 rather than
in the amount of $10,000.
Under a comparative fault system, the application of this policy of
group shares gives rise to some difficult questions: How is the group's
share determined? What is the share of each member of the group? Is
there any need for the policy of group shares? The answer to each
question depends upon how vicarious liability will be treated under the
principle of comparative fault.
First, how is the group's share determined? Under the principle of
equal fault, the calculation is simple. The group is treated as a single
tortfeasor, and the total common liability is divided by the total number of
tortfeasors. Thus, in our previous example, the common liability was
$15,000, and there were two tortfeasors, the individual motorist and the
.group" consisting of the truck driver and the truck driver's employer.
The group share is determined by dividing $15,000 by 2, which equals
$7,500, or one-half of the common liability. But that calculation will not
apply under the principle of comparative fault unless it is proven that the
group and all the individual tortfeasors are equally at fault. Under the
principle of comparative fault, the liability of one of the members of the
group must be selected as the standard by which the group's share of
liability is measured. But which member? The answer is dictated by the
principle which underlies the policy of group shares. Upon analysis, it
becomes apparent that the underlying principle is the principle of com-
parative fault; and, accordingly, equity compares the fault of the tort-
feasor vicariously liable with that of the other tortfeasors, and finds his
or her fault to be zero percent. Therefore, for purposes of contribution,
it groups that tortfeasor with the active tortfeasor whose wrong gave
rise to the vicarious liability to produce a single share rather than two
shares. It follows, therefore, that the group's share is to be measured by
the fault of the active tortfeasor, and the fault of the vicarious tortfeasor
- which is zero percent - is ignored.
112 233 App. Div. 510, 513-34, 253 N.Y.S. 578, 581 (1931), afl'd, 259 N.Y. 530, 182
N.E. 167 (1932). See Wold v. Grozalsky, 277 N.Y. 364, 14 N.E.2d 437 (1938).
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Secondly, what is the share of each member of the group? The in-
dividual tortfeasor seeking contribution from the group need not go
against all the members of the group; he or she may, albeit unwisely,
select one member of the group and seek contribution from only that
member. In such a case, what is that member's share of the group liabil-
ity? The Commissioners' Comment to the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act suggests that where the principle of equal fault prevails,
each member's share is determined by dividing the total of the group's
share by the number of members in the group."3 In our example, the
group's share was $7,500, and there were two members in the group.
Accordingly, the share of each member would be $3,750 - one half of
the group's liability, and one-fourth of the total common liability of
$15,000. But this calculation is inconsistent with the principle of com-
parative fault. Since the principle of comparative fault would treat the
vicariously liable tortfeasor's liability as zero for the purpose of creating
the group, it should also treat it as zero for the purpose of determining
his or her share of the group's share of liability. Therefore, as between
the group, the truck driver's share of the group liability should be 100
percent and the employer's share of the group's liability should be zero
percent. The same should be true as between the motorist and the em-
ployer; under the principle of comparative fault, the employer would
owe nothing by way of contribution to the motorist, but the truck driver
would owe one-half of the common liability, or $7,500.
This result quite logically gives rise to the third question. Where the
principle of comparative fault controls rather than the principle of equal
fault, is there any need for the policy of group shares? If we are correct
in concluding that the principle of comparative fault underlies the policy
of group shares, and if we are also correct in concluding that that prin-
ciple will give purely vicarious fault a value of zero, then the answer is
clearly in the negative. There is no need to do indirectly that which
can be accomplished directly. The policy of group shares is a necessary
equitable balance to the principle of equal fault, but it serves no useful
function when comparative fault is applicable, since this latter principle
does directly what the policy of group shares accomplishes indirectly.
Accordingly, for all practical purposes, that portion of section 2307.31(F)
which enunciates the policy of group shares is mere surplusage.
113 UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS Acr, 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED
87, Comment (1975):
It [the Section of the Uniform Act which authorizes the policy of group shares]
adopts the equitable principle involved in the case of Wold v. Grozalsky, 277
N.W. [sic] 364, 14 N.E.2d 437 (1938), where the plaintiff was injured by the
collapse of a party wall between two buildings. One building was owned by A,
the other jointly by B and C. It was held that B and C were liable each for only
one-fourth of the entire liability, rather than one-third.
Actually, the case does not hold that at all; it holds that B and C are to be treated as a
group, and as a group they are liable for only one-half of the entire liability rather than
two-thirds. The conclusion that each member of the group is liable for one-fourth is an
interpolation which, of necessity, must depend on the application of the principle of equal
liability.
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III. PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING CONTRIBUTION
The above discussion has covered a good many of the substantive
problems which will arise from the application of the Act, and we are
now in a position to discuss the procedure for obtaining contribution.
Before we do so, however, it might be well to create a scenario and
a cast of characters which may be used to illustrate the various pro-
cedural options. Accordingly, let us suppose that Cassandra Claimant
is riding as a passenger in an automobile operated by Connie Contrib-
utor, and that Tommy Tortfeasor is operating his automobile on a con-
verging course with that of Contributor. Through the concurrent negli-
gence of Contributor and Tortfeasor, the two automobiles attempt to
defy the fundamental law that two bodies cannot occupy the same space
at the same time. In short, the two automobiles collide, and Claimant
is injured in the collision. Claimant is herself free of any contributory
negligence or assumption of risk; that is, she has a "clean" case against
both Contributor and Tortfeasor.114 Let us further suppose that Claimant
is entitled to $30,000 in compensatory damages for her injury and other
loss, and that Contributor and Tortfeasor were equally negligent in
causing the collision. Theoretically, then, the proportionate share of the
common liability which each must bear is 50%, or $15,000. Either by
settlement or satisfaction of judgment, Tortfeasor will pay the full
$30,000, and will then seek contribution from Contributor. The pro-
cedures Tortfeasor uses to seek contribution will depend upon the cir-
cumstances; and, particularly, it will depend upon the actions of Claim-
ant.
A. Settlement before Suit
If it can do so to advantage, Tortfeasor's insurance company will
prefer to settle Claimant's claim before Claimant falls into the hands
of an attorney and brings suit against Tortfeasor. If settlement is
achieved, either before suit is commenced or judgment rendered, will
it defeat Tortfeasor's right to contribution?
In principle, it will not, but there are some pitfalls which must be
guarded against. First of all, it is clear from various provisions in the
Act that a judgment against Tortfeasor is not a prerequisite of his seek-
ing contribution." 5 But there is nothing in the Act from which it may
14 It must be remembered that the Ohio guest statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4515.02
(Page 1973) has been declared unconstitutional. Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195,
331 N.E.2d 723 (1975).
' SeC OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(A) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)) which states:
[T]here is a right of contribution among them [the tortfeasors] even though
judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them.
Id. § 2307.31(G):
Whether or not judgment has been entered in an action . . . contribution may be
enforced by separate action.
The placement of section 2307.31(G) in the Ohio Act is interesting. The Ohio Act is
divided into two sections of the Code, sections 2307.31 and 2307.32. Section 2307.31 is
substantive in nature, while section 2307.32 is procedural. Section 2307.31(G) is purely
procedural, since it specifies one of the methods by which contribution may be obtained,
yet it is found in the substantive section of the Act. Why this should be is unclear. In
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be as clearly inferred that the commencement of suit by the claimant
is not a prerequisite, and it can be argued that the reference to judg-
ment in the statute presupposes the commencement of an action, since
there cannot be a judgment in the absence of an action. Indeed, if we
were to look at section 2307.31(G) alone, we would be forced to the
conclusion that commencement of suit was necessary, since that sec-
tion provides for contribution "[w]hether or not judgment has been en-
tered in an action."
However, according to the Commissioners' Comment, it may be con-
cluded that the commencement of an action is not required.1 6 Therefore,
the only essential prerequisite to payment by way of settlement is the
existence of legal liability in fact, and neither commencement of suit by
Claimant nor judgment in Claimant's favor is a necessary prerequisite
to the exercise of the right to contribution.
Section 2307.32(C) indicates the first procedural pitfall: The pay-
ment by way of settlement must be made before the applicable statute
of limitations has expired." 17 In our scenario, there is a two year statute
of limitations applicable to Claimant's claim against Tortfeasor."8
Thus, if Tortfeasor wishes to settle and retain his right to contribution,
he must actually make payment to Claimant within two years following
the collision. It is not enough that an agreement to pay be reached
within the two years. Accordingly, in the unlikely event that settlement
negotiations become protracted, an eye must be kept on the calendar.
This can be of special significance in a case such as ours where we as-
sume Tortfeasor's liability insurance coverage is in the minimal amount of
$12,500 for each claimant and his liability carrier is conducting the set-
tlement negotiations. Suppose that the insurance company is dithering
over the negotiations. As the statute of limitations is about to expire,
the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, this provision is quite logically found
as an integral part of the other procedural provisions. See UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG
TORTFEASORS Acr, 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 88 (1975). Since we have no legislative
history of the Ohio Act, we shall probably never know whether the splitting off of this
procedural provision from the other procedural provisions in section 2307.32 was acci-
dental or intentional, and if intentional, what motivated it.
"I The first clause of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.32(C) (Page Legis. Bull. 389
(1976)) reads:
If there is no judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor
seeking contribution, his right to contribution is barred unless he has either dis-
charged by payment the common liability within the statute of limitations period
applicable to the claimant's right of action against him and has commenced his
action for contribution within one year after payment,
and the Commissioners had this to say of it:
Clause (1) applies to situations where the entire liability to the injured party has
been settled without action being filed.
UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS Acr, 12 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 90, Com-
ment (1975).
117 OIno REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.32(C) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)) states that the:
right of contribution is barred unless he has . . . discharged by payment the com-
mon liability within the statute of limitations period applicable to the claimant's
right of action against him ....
'18 Id. § 2305.10 (Page 1953):
An action for bodily injury or injuring personal property shall be brought within
two years after the cause thereof arose.
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Claimant threatens to obtain an attorney and file suit. To prevent that,
the insurance company, without consulting Tortfeasor, agrees to waive
the defense of the statute of limitations. Claimant and the company
finally agree on a settlement of $20,000, consisting of the policy limits
of $12,500 and $7,500 of Tortfeasor's money. Tortfeasor concurs.
The agreement is reached before the statute of limitations has expired,
but the insurance company does not actually issue its check until after
the expiration date. This supposition presents at least three important
questions: (1) who has the right to contribution, (2) is the right to con-
tribution preserved by the waiver of the defense of the statute of limita-
tions, and (3) if Tortfeasor has lost his right to contribution, what recourse
has he against his insurance company?
First, who has the right to contribution? The answer depends upon
how the courts will interpret "common liability." Here, there are two
potential measurements of common liability: the $30,000 actual dam-
ages suffered by Claimant; or the $20,000 paid by way of settlement.
If the first figure is used, Tortfeasor's proportionate share (since we
have stipulated that he and Contributor are equal in fault) is $15,000;
if the second figure is used, it will be $10,000. In either event, the
insurance company has paid $12,500. However, the insurance company
will not be subrogated to the right to contribution unless it has dis-
charged in full or in part the liability of Tortfeasor; it has discharged
in full its own obligation as insurer; and it has paid an amount in ex-
cess of Tortfeasor's proportionate share." 9 The first two circumstances
are satisfied whether we use the $30,000 or the $20,000 figure, but the
third point requires further consideration. If the common liability of
Tortfeasor and Contributor is valued at $30,000, Tortfeasor's proportion-
ate share is $15,000, and the payment of $12,500 by the insurance com-
pany does not include any amount "in excess of the tortfeasor's propor-
tionate share. ' "2  Therefore, since the insurance company is only
"subrogated to the tortfeasor's right of contribution to the extent of the
amount it has paid in excess of the tortfeasor's proportionate share of
the common liability,"' 2' the sole right to contribution is in Tortfeasor,
and Tortfeasor alone has the right to proceed against Contributor for
$5,000, provided the right to contribution has not been lost by late pay-
ment. On the other hand, if the common liability is measured at $20,000,
Tortfeasor's proportionate share is $10,000 and the insurance company
has paid $2,500 in excess of that proportionate amount. Thus, the in-
surance company is partially subrogated to Tortfeasor, and the two to-
gether must join in seeking contribution,' 22 the insurance company for
$2,500 and Tortfeasor for $7,500. In either event, Tortfeasor has a
right to contribution, unless that right is barred by the late payment of
the insurance company's $12,500.
19 Id. § 2307.31(C) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Onio R. Civ. P. 19(A)(3) provides that "A person who is subject to service of pro-
cess shall be joined as a party in the action if . .. (3) he has an interest relating to the
subject of the action as a . . . subrogor, or subrogee."
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Is the right to contribution preserved by the waiver of the defense
of the statute of limitations? Probably not. Since full payment of the
settlement figure of $20,000 was not made within the period of the
statute of limitations, the right to contribution is barred by operation of
section 2307.32(C) unless it can be said that the waiver of the limita-
tions defense disposes of the bar. The better rule is that it does not.
The bar in section 2307.32(C) is designed to grant Contributor the same
repose which she would have had if she were the sole target of Claim-
ant's claim, and the statute of limitations had run on that claim. Thus,
Contributor can waive the defense of the statute of limitations, but Tort-
feasor cannot waive it for her. By the running of the statute, she should
be entitled to repose both from a claim by Claimant and a claim for
contribution by Tortfeasor. The late payment has, in effect, made Tort-
feasor a volunteer, and he has lost his right to contribution.
What recourse has Tortfeasor against his insurance company? Un-
der the present state of Ohio law, probably none at all. Arguably, since
the insurance company has reserved to itself the sole right to make set-
tlement,1 3 it at least impliedly agrees to exercise due care in doing so
in order to avoid any injury to the rights of its insured. The company
did not exercise due care here, and on the face of it, it would appear
that Tortfeasor has a valid claim against his insurance company for
negligence in making a settlement. However, the law of Ohio as re-
flected in the syllabus of Hart v. Republic Mutual Insurance Co. re-
quires an insurance company to respond in damages to its insured only
if it fails to act in good faith with respect to settlement.1 4  This still
appears to be the law of Ohio. 12 5  And, measured by the standards
enunciated by the Supreme Court of Ohio,126 the insurance company's
conduct here does not amount to a failure to act in good faith. Thus, it
would appear that Tortfeasor is remediless.
In any event, the payment made in settlement must discharge the
common liability. 2 7 When examined in isolation, this discharge re-
quirement appears to preclude a compromise settlement of less than the
full amount of the liability, since anything less than full payment will
123 The liability insuring agreement of most automobile policies will contain language
similar to or the same as the following language found in the standard Family Combina-
tion Automobile Policy: "but the company may make such investigation and settlement
of any claim or suit as it deems expedient."
124 152 Ohio St. 185, 187-88, 87 N.E.2d 347, 349 (1949).
125 Wasserman v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co., 32 Ohio St. 2d 69, 290 N.E.2d 837 (1972).
10 Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Ohio St. 148, 187 N.E.2d 45 (1962), where
it is said in paragraph 2 of the Syllabus:
A lack of good faith is the equivalent of bad faith, and bad faith, although not
susceptible of concrete definition, embraces more than bad judgment or negli-
gence. It imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing,
breach of a known duty through some ulterior motive or ill will partaking of the
nature of the fraud. It also embraces actual intent to mislead or deceive another.
See also Wasserman v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co., 32 Ohio St. 2d 69, 290 N.E.2d 837, 838
(1972), which reaffirms the above statement and declares it to be "a complete and correct
statement of the law of Ohio."
127 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.32(C) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)).
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not discharge the common liability.' However, this provision must be
read in conjunction with section 2307.31(B), which provides that a
tortfeasor who settles is not entitled to contribution from another unless
the other's liability has been "extinguished by the settlement.' 2 9  Ac-
cordingly, discharged, as used in section 2307.32(C) is the equivalent
of extinguished in section 2307.31(B), and if a compromise settlement
is arranged so as to extinguish the liability of those tortfeasors from
whom contribution is sought, the common liability will be deemed to
have been discharged. On the other hand, if the compromise settle-
ment is not arranged so as to extinguish the claim against the other tort-
feasors, the tortfeasor entering into the settlement has no right to seek
contribution from the others. Further, if the settling tortfeasor arranges
things properly, he can obtain immunity from the obligation to contrib-
ute to those tortfeasors who have not settled.130
Returning to our example, Tortfeasor, through his insurance com-
pany, has agreed to settle Claimant's claim for $20,000. Since that
sum is less than the full amount of the common liability, its payment
will not automatically discharge the common liability, nor will it extin-
guish Claimant's claim against Contributor. By paying this amount,
Tortfeasor will lose his right to contribution from Contributor unless he
arranges for the extinguishment of the claim against Contributor. This
may be done by the use of a release or a covenant not to sue. While
Tortfeasor may lose his right to contribution from Contributor, he will
gain immunity from contribution should Claimant proceed against Con-
tributor and should Contributor then seek contribution from Tortfeasor.
Thus, immunity from contribution is the quid pro quo for giving up the
right to contribution.'13
128 A claimant may present his claim to as many defendants as he can find, and he
may have judgments in his favor against each. But he is entitled to only one satisfaction
of that claim or those judgments. Once the claimant has received full satisfaction, further
action is barred, and his claim is extinguished. A full settlement of the claim is such
satisfaction, and it discharges the common liability, and extinguishes the claimant's claim
as against all other defendants. But a compromise settlement for less than the whole of
plaintiff's claim will be only a pro tanto discharge of the common liability, and will not
extinguish the claim as against other defendants unless the compromise settlement re-
leases those other defendants by express agreement or by operation of law. Losito v.
Kruse, 136 Ohio St. 183, 24 N.E.2d 705 (1940); Whiteacre v. Board of Education, 42
Ohio App. 2d 19, 326 N.E.2d 696 (1974).
129 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(B) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)).
130 Id. § 2307.32(F)(2) (Page Legis. Bull. 390 (1976)):
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in
good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the
same wrongful death: . .. (2) it discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given
from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor.
131 The reader may well wonder what Tortfeasor has gained here. By paying the
$20,000 in settlement, he has paid $5,000 more than his proportionate share of the common
liability, and he has forfeited his right to go against Contributor for that $5,000. In re-
turn, he has obtained immunity from nothing, since Contributor, if she paid the balance of
$10,000, would not have paid more than her proportionate share of the common liability
and would not have a claim for contribution against Tortfeasor. But we know this to be
the case only because it was stipulated that the value of the common liability is $30,000.
In a real negligence action, that value would not be known. All of the attorneys involved
might have some good educated guesses as to what Claimant's case is worth, but none of
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As noted, Tortfeasor may arrange the compromise settlement to dis-
charge the common liability and extinguish the claim against Contributor
through the adroit use of a release or a covenant not to sue. Herein
lies a pitfall for Claimant. To illustrate, we must first examine the
present Ohio law of releases and covenants not to sue, and then we must
see how the provisions of the Act affect that law.
Broadly speaking, releases are either unqualified or qualified.
When an agreement in absolute terms releases and discharges a wrong-
doer it is an unqualified release 132 and has the effect of releasing all
other wrongdoers liable for the same wrong. As stated in Whitt v.
Hutchison, 33 a general, unqualified release "is presumed in law to be
a release for the benefit of all the wrongdoers."
Thus, unless section 2307.32(F)(1) compels a different conclusion,
if Claimant gives Tortfeasor an unqualified release for a compromise
settlement of less than the full amount of Claimant's damages, the set-
tlement and release will discharge the common liability and will extin-
guish Claimant's claim against Contributor. 34
A release is qualified when it (a) either specifies that the amount
received is not in full satisfaction of the claimant's damages, or fails to
specify that the amount received is in full satisfaction of the claimant's
damages; (b) expressly provides that it is solely and exclusively for the
benefit of the parties thereto; or (c) expressly reserves a right of action
as against any other wrongdoer. A qualified release will be interpreted
according to the expressed intent of the parties. As a general rule, the
express reservation of the right of action will be given effect, and the
release will be interpreted as a release of only the wrongdoers who are
parties to the release. Such a release will discharge the common liabil-
ity only to the extent of the amount paid in settlement, and will not ex-
tinguish the claimant's claim against wrongdoers who are not parties to
the release. 135  If, however, a release recites that the amount paid in
settlement is received in full satisfaction of the claim but then attempts
to expressly reserve a right of action against other wrongdoers not
parties to the release, the recitation of full satisfaction and the express
them would know the true value of the common liability until the jury returned its verdict
or until the court sitting without a jury announced its decision. Thus, in a real case, a
$20,000 settlement might appear to be a good gamble. Again, Tortfeasor might know that
Contributor is judgment proof, and that any right of contribution which he might have
would be illusory. Thus, rather than be held for the full $30,000, he might feel it worth-
while to give up the illusory right of contribution and settle for $20,000.
132 For an example of such an unqualified release, see Whitt v. Hutchison, 43 Ohio
St. 2d 53, 330 N.E.2d 678 (1975).
133 Id.
134 Garbe v. Halloran, 150 Ohio St. 476, 83 N.E.2d 217 (1948). As stated in para-
graph 4 of the syllabus:
Payment by one concurrent tort-feasor for his release from the injured person,
even though not in full payment of the damage suffered but only in full payment
of the claim of the injured person against him, operates to relieve from liability
other concurrent tort-feasors likewise liable for the same tort, unless the injured
person reserves the right to pursue such other concurrent tort-feasors for the
remainder of his damage.
135 Adams Express Co. v. Beckwith, 100 Ohio St. 348, 126 N.E. 300 (1919).
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reservation are inconsistent. The recitation of full satisfaction will be
given preference, and the release will be treated as unqualified. 136
If the wrongdoers are in a position vis-a-vis each other such that
one would have a common law right of indemnity against the other, and
a qualified release purports to release the potential indemnitor, such a
release also operates to release the potential indemnitee, even though the
claimant has attempted to reserve a right of action against the potential
indemnitee. The theory being that the release of the wrongdoer primarily
liable by discharging the claimant's claim against that wrongdoer, de-
stroys the right of the wrongdoer secondarily liable to be subrogated to
the claimant's claim, and thereby destroys the indemnity rights of the
secondarily liable wrongdoer. 137
Since our scenario does not involve a primary-secondary liability
situation, if Claimant and Tortfeasor enter into a properly qualified re-
lease which contains no inconsistencies, the release and the settlement
will discharge the common liability only pro tanto, and should not ex-
tinguish Claimant's claim against Contributor. At least, that is true un-
less section 2307.32(F)(1) demands a different interpretation.
Thus, under the present Ohio law of releases, a compromise settle-
ment for less than the full amount of Claimant's damages will preserve
Tortfeasor's right of contribution against Contributor if the settlement
is arranged through an unqualified release, but it will not if the settle-
ment is arranged through a qualified release. The qualified release,
however, will at least give Tortfeasor immunity from any claim for con-
tribution which Contributor may later assert against him.1 3 1
Now, how does the language of the Act affect the present law?
Section 2307.32(F)(1) provides that a release or a covenant not to sue
does not discharge other tortfeasors "unless its terms otherwise pro-
vide."13 9 The difficulty springs from the phrase "unless its terms other-
wise provide." Obviously, this section will have no effect on a properly
qualified release. If a release purporting to be qualified contained such
an express discharge of the other wrongdoers, it would contain an in-
consistency which, according to Riley v. Cincinnati,40 would convert it
into an unqualified release. Thus, the problem is with the unqualified
release. Does "unless its terms otherwise provide" require an express
statement of discharge or is the legal inference of discharge which is
drawn from an unqualified release sufficient? If an express statement
of discharge is required, the Act changes the Ohio law of unqualified
releases, at least in cases involving contribution. If the legal inference
is sufficient, the Act works no change in the present Ohio law, since
136 See Riley v. Cincinnati, 46 Ohio St. 2d 287, 294-95, 348 N.E.2d 135, 140-41
(1976) (interpreting Hillyer v. City of East Cleveland, 155 Ohio St. 552, 99 N.E.2d 772
(1951)).
137 Hillyer v. City of East Cleveland, 155 Ohio St. 552, 99 N.E.2d 772 (1951); Herron
v. City of Youngstown, 136 Ohio St. 190, 24 N.E.2d 708 (1940); Losito v. Kruse, 136
Ohio St. 183, 24 N.E.2d 705 (1940); Bello v. City of Cleveland, 106 Ohio St. 94, 138
N.E. 526 (1922).
138 Otuo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.32(F)(2) (Page Legis. Bull. 390 (1976)).
M3 Id. § 2307.32(F)(1).
140 Riley V. Cincinnati, 46 Ohio St. 2d 287, 348 N.E.2d 135 (1976).
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an unqualified release is deemed to provide for the discharge of the
other wrongdoers. The interpretation most often given to the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act is that the joint tortfeasor "must
be released by name."'' But this is not necessarily controlling, since
there is a difference between the language of the Uniform Act and the
language of the Ohio Act. The Uniform Act employs the phrase "un-
less its terms so provide," while the Ohio Act states "unless its terms
otherwise provide." "So" can be interpreted to require specificity by
name or otherwise, while "otherwise" can be read to mean the legal
inference to be drawn from the terms used.
The Ohio Supreme Court has touched on the matter, but has left the
question unresolved. Thus, Whitt v. Hutchison,142 noted that there was
a conflict among the states which had adopted the Uniform Act regard-
ing a tortfeasor who had not been discharged by name. From this, one
would be hard put to guess how the Ohio Supreme Court would go now
that Ohio has its own Act, especially since Ohio's Act differs signifi-
cantly from the language of the Uniform Act.
Perhaps the solution lies in the difference. Without a legislative
history, we cannot know for certain what the General Assembly intended,
but it must have intended something when it substituted "unless its
terms otherwise provide" for "unless its terms so provide." The latter
phrase has a definite interpretation given it by the majority of states
having the Uniform Act, but the former phrase does not. Further, the
former phrase can be read in such a way that it does not mandate any
change in the present law. Therefore, it is legitimate to conclude that
the substitution was intended to retain the present Ohio law of unquali-
fied releases without change or addition because of the Act, and was in-
tended to reject the majority interpretation of the Uniform Act. This
conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the majority view would add
nothing but would subtract much. Under the present law, an unquali-
fied release will subject Contributor to a claim for contribution from
Tortfeasor, but will also immunize Contributor from any further claim for
compensation from Claimant. But what is a release - otherwise un-
qualified - which does not comply with the majority view? Is it a quali-
fied release for purposes of contribution, but an unqualified release
for all other purposes, or is it a qualified release for all purposes?
Therefore, since the majority view would add nothing of value to the
existing law, but would be productive of mischief and confusion in an
area that is already fraught with complexity, it is fair to assume that the
141 United States v. Reilly, 385 F.2d 225, 229 (10th Cir. 1967):
[T]he weight of authority under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
* . .holds that a joint tortfeasor must be released by name in order for the set-
tling joint tortfeasor to recover contribution, and this notwithstanding language
in the settlement or order of approval purporting to satisfy "all claims" arising
out of the incident.
(Emphasis in the original.) See also Allbright Bros., Contractors, Inc. v. Hull-Dobbs Co.,
209 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1953).
142 43 Ohio St. 2d 53, 57-58, 330 N.E.2d 678, 681-82 (1975). The language quoted
from the Uniform Act is taken from the 1939 Act rather than from the 1955 Revised Act.
See UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONc TORTFEASORS AcT, 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 58
(1975).
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General Assembly did not intend that Ohio follow the majority view,
and it signaled this intent by substituting "otherwise" for "so."
Until recent years, there was considerable confusion as to the dif-
ference between a release and a covenant not to sue. A covenant not
to sue, which does not purport to release or transfer any cause of action
for an injury and which does not expressly recognize the consideration
paid thereunder as full satisfaction for the injury, will not bar actions
against others for causing the injury where the injury has not been fully
compensated, and this is true whether such a covenant expressly re-
serves rights against others, or not.1 Thus, a true covenant not to sue
neither discharges the common liability nor extinguishes the claim;
it is merely an agreement not to press the claim by means of legal ac-
tion.144
There is a very technical difference between a qualified release and
a covenant not to sue. When money is paid in settlement for a qualified
release, the claim itself is discharged pro tanto, and to that extent,
the claim is transferred to the wrongdoer who is party to the release.
In a primary-secondary liability situation, it is this transfer of the claim
which destroys the indemnity rights of the wrongdoer secondarily liable,
and converts the qualified release into an unqualified one. 45 When money
is paid in settlement for a covenant not to sue, however, the wrongdoer
who is party to the covenant merely buys freedom from a law suit and
not a part of the claim. Thus, the claim is neither discharged pro tanto14
nor is it in any way transferred to the wrongdoer. Since there is no
transfer of the claim itself, the indemnity right of a wrongdoer secon-
darily liable are not affected, and the covenant not to sue does not be-
come an unqualified release. 14
7
Section 2307.32(F)(1) works no change in the present law with re-
spect to convenants not to sue. As that section notes, the covenant
not to sue does not discharge wrongdoers who are not parties to it "un-
less its terms otherwise provide," but it reduces the claim against them
to the extent of the amount either stipulated by the covenant or paid in
consideration for it, whichever is greater. As for the phrase, "unless its
terms otherwise provide," the terms of a true convenant not to sue do
" Whitt v. Hutchison, 43 Ohio St. 2d 53, 330 N.E.2d 678 (1975). See also Bacik v.
Weaver, 173 Ohio St. 214, 180 N.E.2d 820 (1962).
144 Riley v. Cincinnati, 46 Ohio St. 2d 287, 348 N.E.2d 135 (1976); Diamond v. Davis
Bakery, Inc., 8 Ohio St. 2d 38, 222 N.E.2d 430 (1966).
'4 See cases cited note 137 supra.
146 It has been said that the sum paid in settlement for a covenant not to sue discharges
the claim pro tanto. Adams Express Co. v. Beckwith, 100 Ohio St. 348, 128 N.E. 300
(1919). That is not really true at all, since the covenant not to sue does not affect the
claim. The practical effect, however, is much the same as a pro tanto discharge; since
the claimant is entitled to but one full satisfaction of the claim and equity will demand
that the satisfaction he obtains from the wrongdoers who are not parties to the covenant
be reduced by the amount which he has previously received from the wrongdoers who
are parties to the covenant. In other words, the non-party wrongdoers are given credit
for the sum paid by the party wrongdoers. This distinction is only important when one
or more of the non-party wrongdoers would have a common law claim for indemnity
against the wrongdoer who is a party to the covenant.
"' Riley v. Cincinnati, 46 Ohio St. 2d 287, 348 N.E.2d 135 (1976).
[Vol. 25:151
38https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol25/iss2/3
CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS
not, 4 and should a document which purports to be a covenant not to
sue contain terms which discharge non-party wrongdoers, it would be an
unqualified release and not a true covenant not to sue. As for the re-
duction in the claim, that effect is already achieved by the present Ohio
law with respect to covenants not to sue, so the Act adds nothing in this
respect.
To summarize: If Tortfeasor settles in full Claimant's damages, the
settlement will, by operation of law, discharge the common liability
and extinguish the claim against Contributor since Claimant is entitled
to but one satisfaction of her damages. Tortfeasor will have a right
of contribution against Contributor to the extent that the amount paid
in settlement exceeds his proportionate share of the common liability.
Likewise, if Tortfeasor partially settles Claimant's damages, but re-
ceives from Claimant an unqualified release in return therefor, the
common liability is discharged, and the claim against Contributor ex-
tinguished, by the terms of the release. Tortfeasor will have a right of
contribution against Contributor to the extent that the amount paid in
settlement exceeds his proportionate share of the common liability.
But if Tortfeasor partially settles Claimant's damages, and receives
a qualified release or a covenant not to sue in return therefor, the
common liability is not discharged, and Claimant's claim against Con-
tributor is not extinguished. Tortfeasor has no claim for contribution
against Contributor even if he has paid in settlement more than his
proportionate share of the common liability. On the other hand, the
qualified release or the covenant not to sue discharges Tortfeasor from
all liability for contribution to Contributor should he have paid less in
settlement than his proportionate share, and should Contributor, by judg-
ment or otherwise, be forced to pay Claimant more than her proportion-
ate share.
The Act contains one further limitation on settlement and the right
to contribution. By the terms of section 2307.31(B), a tortfeasor who
enters into a settlement with the claimant is not entitled to recover
contribution in respect to any amount paid by way of settlement which
is in excess of what is reasonable. Thus, when Tortfeasor seeks contri-
bution from Contributor, he must be prepared to prove that the amount
paid in settlement was a reasonable amount.
There remains the unresolved problem of whether Contributor must
be vouched into the controversy before Tortfeasor will acquire his right
to contribution. If we look to cases involving the analagous remedy of
indemnity, we find that the vouching in of the indemnitor is a prere-
quisite to a claim for indemnity. 149
148 See, e.g., the terms of the covenant not to sue. Id. at 290-91, 348 N.E.2d at
136-37.
149 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Frederick Co., 142 Ohio St. 605, 53 N.E.2d 795 (1944).
As paragraph 4 of the syllabus states:
Before a tortfeasor secondarily liable may be entitled to indemnity from the one
primarily liable, the latter must be fully and fairly informed of the claim and the
pendency of the action and given full opportunity to defend or participate.
And in paragraph 4 of the syllabus of Globe Indem. Co. v. Schmitt, 142 Ohio St. 595,
53 N.E.2d 790 (1944):
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Should vouching in be a prerequisite to contribution as well? Prob-
ably not. The right to indemnity is a common law right, and it is con-
trolled by the common law. But the right to contribution between
tortfeasors is purely statutory and nowhere in the statute is vouching in
made a prerequisite to the exercise of the right to contribution. Since
the statute does not require it by express terms, there is no justification
for importing this common law requirement into the statute by judicial
construction.
If the settlement is reasonable, if it discharges the common liability
and extinguishes Claimant's claim against Contributor, and if the amount
agreed upon in settlement has actually been paid by or on behalf of
Tortfeasor before the statute of limitations applicable to Claimant's
claim has expired, then Tortfeasor or his subrogee may bring a separate
action against Contributor for contribution to the extent that the amount
paid in settlement exceeds Tortfeasor's proportionate share of the com-
mon liability.
As stated in section 2307.32(C), the action for contribution must be
commenced within one year after the date of payment. Commenced,
of course, must be understood in the sense that it is used in Ohio Civil
Rule 3(a), to wit: "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint
with the court, if service is obtained within one year from such filing."'
150
Is either Tortfeasor or Contributor entitled to a jury trial in a separate
action for contribution? This action, a creature of statute, is a type
of action which did not exist prior to the adoption of the Ohio Constitu-
tion. Consequently, there was no right to trial by jury in such actions
prior to the adoption of the Constitution. Therefore, there is no consti-
tutional right to trial by jury; and if any such right exists, it must be found
in the statutes of the state.' 5' No such right is found in the Act itself,
but such a right can be found in Ohio Revised Code section 2311.04,
which provides:
Issues of fact arising in actions for the recovery of money only,
. . . shall be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived, or a
reference is ordered as provided in [The Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure].
Here, although the action is equitable in nature, the relief sought is a
judgment for a precise and definite sum of money. Therefore, the ac-
tion is "for the recovery of money only," and the issues of fact in the ac-
tion are triable to a jury.15 2
But how much may Tortfeasor recover? We know from the Act that
Whether the [indemniteel settles the claim voluntarily or pays it by force of a
judgment does not affect his right to indemnity. But in an action for indemnity
after voluntary settlement, the [indemnitee] must prove that he has gi;.en proper
and timely notice to the one from whom such indemnity is sought, tha he was
legally liable to respond, and that the settlement made was fair and reasonable.
(Emphasis added.)
'50 OHIO R. Civ. P. 3(A).
I51 Renee v. Sanders, 160 Ohio St. 279, 116 N.E.2d 420 (1953).
152 Taylor v. Brown, 92 Ohio St. 287, 110 N.E. 739 (1915).
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he may recover that amount which he has paid in excess of his propor-
tionate share of the common liability. But when there has been a settle-
ment before judgment, how is the common liability measured? And
once a value has been put on it, is Tortfeasor entitled to interest, or dam-
ages in the nature of interest, from the date of settlement?
W. B. Rubright Co. v. International Harvester Co.'5 suggests an-
swers to both these questions. As to the common liability, the value of
the common liability is the amount reasonably paid in settlement of the
claim where the amount so paid discharges the liability and extinguishes
the claim against the wrongdoer from whom contribution is sought. As
to interest, or damages in the nature of interest, it will be allowed to the
same extent that the claimant would be allowed interest in an action
brought on his or her claim. As a general rule, pre-judgment interest
is not allowed to the claimant in the type of action subject to the Act
because the sum due the claimant cannot, before judgment, be estab-
lished or ascertained with any degree of mathematical certainty. There-
fore, since the claimant would not be entitled to pre-judgment interest,
the tortfeasor who settles the claim and seeks contribution is not entitled
to such interest either. A stipulation as to the reasonableness of the set-
tlement might require a different result, depending upon when the stipu-
lation was made. If the tortfeasor subject to contribution stipulates as
to the reasonableness of the settlement in the action for contribution,
the stipulation will not relate back to the time of the settlement, and will
not warrant the award of interest. On the other hand, if the tortfeasor
subject to contribution was vouched in before settlement was made, and
stipulated to the reasonableness of the settlement at that time, but there-
after resisted or refused to make contribution, the stipulation could be
construed as establishing the claimant's claim, or rendering the amount
of the claim ascertainable with some degree of mathematical certainty.
An award of interest, or damages in the nature of interest, would then
be warranted from the date of settlement. Thus, while vouching in does
not appear to be required, it could possibly be rewarding.
B. Suit Against Tortfeasor Alone
If Claimant brings suit against Tortfeasor alone, there are a number
of ways in which Tortfeasor can seek contribution from Contributor.
(1) Settlement before Judgment. The first option open to Tort-
feasor is settlement of the suit before judgment, followed by a separate
suit for contribution against Contributor. Much that has been said above
with respect to settlement before suit is also applicable here, but there
are some differences. For example, if suit has been commenced, the
settlement need not be paid before the applicable statute of limitations
expires. Rather, it is sufficient if Tortfeasor agrees while the action is
pending to discharge the common liability; pays the amount agreed up-
on within one year after the date of the agreement; and commences
his separate suit for contribution within one year after the date of the
"'1358 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
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agreement. 154  The settlement, of course, must wholly discharge the
common liability and extinguish the claim against Contributor. 55 As
noted above, this may be accomplished either by the payment in full of
Claimant's damages, or by a partial payment accompanied by an un-
qualified release. In either case, the amount agreed upon in payment
must be reasonable in light of all the circumstances.1 56 If the amount
agreed upon and paid is a reasonable amount, it will be used as the
measure of the common liability.'57 To revert to our example, if Tort-
feasor pays $20,000 in settlement, and that amount is reasonable in
light of all the circumstances, the value of the common liability will be
set at $20,000. Since Tortfeasor and Contributor are equally at fault,
Tortfeasor may seek $10,000 in contribution from Contributor.
Note that section 2307.32(C) specifies that both payment and the
commencement of the suit for contribution must occur within one year
of the agreement. This must be read in conjunction with section
2307.31(A), which states that the right of contribution exists only in
favor of a tortfeasor who has made payment. Thus, while payment
and commencement of suit must both occur within the year, payment
must precede commencement of suit.
Of course, the settlement and release alone are not sufficient. The
lawsuit must still be terminated. This may best be done by a judgment
entry dismissing the action with prejudice, which judgment entry may be
obtained under the provisions of Ohio Civil Rule 41(a)(2).
(2) Offer of Judgment. By the adroit use of the offer of judgment
technique suggested by Civil Rule 68, Tortfeasor may obtain all of the
benefits of a settlement, and some additional advantages as well.
Tortfeasor's first step is the vouching in of Contributor. If Contrib-
utor accepts the invitation to participate in the defense, the ploy is foiled.
But the likelihood is that Contributor will reject the invitation, and will
not become a party to the lawsuit. If Contributor rejects the invitation,
Tortfeasor and Claimant should waive the jury, if one had previously
been demanded, and agree upon a sum which will satisfy the claim.
Tortfeasor will then serve upon Claimant an offer to allow judgment to be
taken against him for the amount agreed upon in advance. Claimant
will respond by serving upon Tortfeasor a written notice that the offer
is accepted. Either Tortfeasor or Claimant will then file the offer,
the acceptance, and a draft judgment entry with the court. After the
judgment entry has been approved and journalized, Tortfeasor will pay
154 OmIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.32(C) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)) provides:
If there is no judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor
seeking contribution, his right of contribution is barred unless he has . . . agreed
while action is pending against him to discharge the common liability and has
within one year after the agreement paid the liability and commenced his action
for contribution.
155 Id.; Id. § 2307.31(B).
156 Id. § 2307.31(B).
157 W. D. Rubright Co. v. International Harvester Co., 358 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (W.D.
Pa. 1973).
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the judgment,' and will commence his action against Contributor for
contribution.s5
Since Contributor had been vouched into the action she will be con-
cluded by the judgment. In the absence of fraud or collusion tainting
the actions of Tortfeasor and Claimant, the judgment will be conclusive
evidence against her as to the amount of the common liability, and
will preclude her from asserting in the suit for contribution any defense
that might have been interposed in Claimant's action against Tort-
feasor. 1 0
(3) Impleader. If Tortfeasor is determined to contest Claimant's
action, he may implead Contributor by means of a third party action,
and thereby obtain a judicial declaration of Contributor's duty to con-
tribute after Tortfeasor has paid whatever judgment Claimant may ob-
tain against him. As Civil Rule 14(A) states:
At any time after commencement of the action a defending
party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and com-
plaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action who
is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim
against him.161
This fits contribution perfectly since, if there is common liability to
Claimant, Contributor "may be" liable to Tortfeasor for "part of" Claim-
"" Payment of the judgment is essential, since section 2307.31(A) specifies that the
right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his or
her proportionate share. Payment of the judgment will, of course, automatically dis-
charge and extinguish Claimant's claim against Contributor, but this will not bar Tort-
feasor's action for contribution. As stated in Otio REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.32(D) (Page
Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)):
The recovery of a judgment for an injury or wrongful death against one tortfeasor
does not of itself discharge the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or
wrongful death unless the judgment is satisfied. The satisfaction of the judg-
ment does not impair any right of contribution.
159 This separate action must be commenced within one year after the judgment has
become final "by lapse of time for appeal or after appellate review." OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2307.32(B) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)). Since, in our particular situation,
there will be no appellate review, the beginning day of this one year period of limitations
will be the 31st day after the judgment has been journalized. In other words, when no
appeal is taken, the separate action for contribution must be commenced within one year
and 30 days from the date the judgment entry is journalized.
"6 20 Omo Jua. 2d Indemnity § 23 (1958). Although most of the cases so holding
involve indemnity rather than contribution, there is no reason to believe that the principle
does not apply to contribution as well. As it was said in First Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l
Bank, 68 Ohio St. 43, 50, 67 N.E. 91, 93 (1903):
The reason for the doctrine does not suggest that there should be any limit to its
application because of the nature of the obligation over of the person notified.
Upon examination of numerous decisions in other states and in the Federal courts,
it appears that the doctrine is of general application, without regard to the nature
of the liability over of the person notified, whether it arises out of contract or by
operation of law. . . . They seem to recognize no exception to the rule that in
an action to recover from one liable over on account of a demand upon which
there has been a judgment against the plaintiff the defendant is bound by such
judgment if he had due notice of the suit in which it was rendered, and an op-
portunity to defend.
'61 OHio R. Civ. P. 14(A) (emphasis added).
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ant's claim against Tortfeasor.162 Thus, the issues respecting Claim-
ant's claim for compensatory damages and the issues respecting Tort-
feasor's claim for contribution can all be litigated in the same action.'1
The rights of Contributor are fully protected since she may not only fully
defend against Tortfeasor's claim, but may also assert against Claimant
any defenses which Tortfeasor has against Claimant.
The third party claim does not in any way circumvent section
2307.31(A)'s declaration that the right of contribution does not exist
until Tortfeasor has paid more than his proportionate share of the com-
mon liability because the third party claim is not a claim for contribution.
Rather, it is an action for a declaratory judgment: a judgment which
declares the common liability of Tortfeasor and Contributor to Claimant;
the proportionate share of that liability attributable to each; and the
obligation of Contributor to pay to Tortfeasor a sum, not to exceed
Contributor's own proportionate share of the liability, which will off-
set the amount Tortfeasor will pay to Claimant in excess of Tortfeasor's
proportionate share of the common liability. This obligation will come
into existence only after Tortfeasor has made payment to Claimant. In
other words, the third party action is a device for accelerating the judicial
determination that Contributor has an obligation to make contribution
to Tortfeasor. The judgment in the third party action is of necessity
contingent in nature; it is contingent upon Tortfeasor actually paying
more than his proportionate share of the common liability to Claimant.
If Tortfeasor never makes payment to Claimant, the third party judg-
ment imposes no obligation on Contributor. But when Tortfeasor makes
payment to Claimant, Contributor is obliged to make contribution in ac-
162 In paragraph 2 of the syllabus of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Charlton, 41 Ohio
App. 2d 107, 322 N.E.2d 333 (1974) it was stated:
Where a plaintiff chooses to sue only one of two joint or concurrent tortfeasors,
the defendant may not maintain a third-party complaint against the other tort-
feasor because there is no right of contribution from a co-tortfeasor.
This statement is based on the Rules Advisory Committee's Staff Note to OHIo R. Civ.
P. 14, which states in part:
In contrast, if a plaintiff chose to sue only one of two joint or concurrent tort-
feasors, the defendant tortfeasor could not implead the other tortfeasor under
Rule 14(A) because in Ohio a joint or concurrent tortfeasor is liable for the full
amount of the claim and does not enjoy the right of contribution from a co-tort-
feasor.
The implication to be drawn from each of these statements is that impleader could be
used if the right of contribution was recognized in Ohio law. With the enactment of
sections 2307.31 and 2307.32 of the Ohio Revised Code, that right is recognized, and
impleader becomes available in this type of case.
1'3 As the court noted in Markey v. Skog, 129 N.J. Super. 192, 200, 322 A.2d 513,
517 (1974):
The assertion by codefendants in a negligence action of a right of contribution
inter sese and the right of a defendant to implead a joint tortfeasor by a third-
party complaint before plaintiff's cause of action has been reduced to a judg-
ment are merely devices of procedural convenience afforded by the rules of prac-
tice .... Thus, although a defendant is not necessarily bound to proceed against
joint tortfeasors in the same action in which plaintiff seeks to establish his (de-
fendant's) liability, he ordinarily will, nevertheless, do so because a single ac-
tion is the most orderly manner in which proof of common liability can be estab-
lished - and it is, of course, common liability which is the substantive basis of the
right of contribution.
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cordance with the terms of the third party judgment. Thus, the third
party claim is not a claim for contribution in violation of section 2307.31
(A) since it does not require contribution until after payment has been
made and the right of contribution comes into existence.
The third party action, of course, will be commenced before judg-
ment is rendered in Claimant's action against Tortfeasor, and for this
reason, it may be argued that, at least in some instances, section
2307.32(C) prohibits third party actions. That section stipulates that if
there is no judgment against Tortfeasor, his right to contribution is
barred unless he either discharges by payment the common liability
within the statute of limitations period applicable to Claimant's right of
action against him or agrees while the action is pending to discharge
the common liability. In the usual case, Tortfeasor will have done
neither of these two things before commencing the third party action.
Indeed, in some cases, it might be impossible for Tortfeasor to accom-
plish the first requirement since Claimant may not commence the ac-
tion against Tortfeasor until the last day or two of the limitations
period, thereby giving Tortfeasor no time to discharge the common lia-
bility within the statutory period of limitations.
And it is this fact which indicates the inapplicability of section 2307.32
(C) to the present situation and which demonstrates the invalidity of the
argument. Section 2307.32(C) is composed of two clauses. The first, in
substance, requires discharge by payment before the statute of limita-
tions runs, and the second requires an agreement to discharge by pay-
ment while Claimant's action is pending. It is clear that the first clause
is applicable only to settlements made by Tortfeasor before suit is com-
menced against him, and the second clause is applicable only when
Tortfeasor chooses to settle before judgment. The first clause has no
applicability at all when Claimant has commenced suit against Tort-
feasor, and the second cluase has no applicability when Tortfeasor
elects to contest such a suit to judgment rather than settle it. Thus,
neither clause bars the third party action. In any event, should either
clause be held applicable to the impleader situation, the statutory sec-
tion would be in conflict with Ohio Civil Rule 14(A), and to the extent
of that conflict, those statutory provisions would be invalid.1
6 4
(4) Separate Action after Judgment. It may be that Tortfeasor
wishes to contest Claimant's suit to judgment, but he cannot implead
Contributor because Contributor is beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
In such a case, Tortfeasor's only practical option will be a separate suit
164 Otno CONST. Art. IV, § 5(B) provides:
The supreme court shall prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all
courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substan-
tive right .... All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force
or effect after such rules have taken effect.
This provision applies not only to laws which were in effect at the time the Rules were
adopted but also to all laws which are passed thereafter and which are in conflict with
the Rules. Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (Cuy. Cty. C.P.
1976).
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against Contributor after Claimant has taken a judgment against him,
and after he has satisfied that judgment. 16 5
The authority for such a separate action is not as clearly stated in
the Act as it might be. 16 6  At first blush, the statutory provision might
appear to apply only where the action is brought against two or more
tortfeasors; but properly understood, it means that a judgment need not
be rendered in a single action against all the tortfeasors before the right
to contribution can be enforced by a separate action. By inference,
then, when an action goes to judgment against only one tortfeasor, that
tortfeasor may exercise his or her right to contribution from other tort-
feasors by a separate action against them. This inference is reinforced
by section 2307.32(B), which states the one year statute of limitations
for separate actions to enforce the right of contribution.
Of course, Tortfeasor may obtain some of the benefits of impleader
by vouching in Contributor. A person not a party to the action may be
vouched in even though he or she is not amenable to service of pro-
cess. 16 7  If Contributor is vouched in, and given an opportunity to de-
fend, and the common liability of Tortfeasor and Contributor, as well as
the percentage of fault of each therein, is fully and fairly litigated, the
judgment and findings of fact with respect to Contributor's share of the
common liability will be conclusive upon Contributor should she fail to
accept the invitation to participate in the defense of the action. 168
If the case is tried to the jury, the provisions of Ohio Civil Rule 49(B)
must be considered. That Rule states that "interrogatories may be direct-
ed to . . . determinative issues.' 69 Determinative issues have been de-
fined as ultimate issues which, when decided, will definitely settle the
entire controversy between or among the parties, leaving nothing for the
court to do but enter judgment for the party or parties in whose favor such
determinative issues have been resolved by the jury. 170 In a negligence
action the determinative issues are negligence, proximate cause, con-
165 The reader should not imply from this remark that the use of impleader is man-
datory if it is otherwise available. By the terms of OHIO R. Civ. P. 14, impleader is
permissive; the defendant has the option of employing a third party claim before judg-
ment, or a separate suit after judgment. This is equally true when the subject of the
third party claim is contribution. Markey v. Skog, 129 N.J. Super. 192, 322 A.2d 513
(1974); Maloney Concrete Co. v. District of Columbia Transit Sys., Inc., 241 Md. 420, 216
A.2d 895 (1966); Murphy v. Barron, 45 Misc. 2d 905, 258 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App. Div. 1965).
As stated in Maloney Concrete Co. v. District of Columbia Transit Sys., Inc., 241 Md. at
422, 216 A.2d at 896:
The purpose and meaning of the rule is clear. It permits a defendant to bring
in anyone as a third party defendant who is or may be liable to the original de-
fendant for all or part of the claim of the plaintiff, but it does not require the
joinder of such party, nor preclude separate action against him.
(Emphasis in the original.)
166 The authority is found in OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31(G) (Page Legis. Bull.
389 (1976)):
Whether or not judgment has been entered in an action against two or more tort-
feasors for the same injury or wrongful death, contribution may be enforced by
separate action.
I Hessler v. Hillwood Mfg. Co., 302 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1962).
l65 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.32(E) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)).
'69 OHIO R. Civ. P. 49(B).
170 Miller v. McAllister, 169 Ohio St. 487, 494, 160 N.E.2d 231, 237 (1959).
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tributory negligence, and damages.1 71  In our situation, since Claimant
is entitled to a several judgment against Tortfeasor, and a full satisfac-
tion of that judgment from him, it is questionable whether the negligence
of Contributor, or the percentage of fault Tortfeasor and Contributor
each bear to the common liability, are in any sense determinative of
Claimant's action against Tortfeasor. If they are not determinative is-
sues, then any answers to interrogatories respecting these issues which
the jury might give would not be valid answers;17 - and, as such, would
not be "binding as among such defendants in determining their right to
contribution."
According to section 2307.32(B), the separate action to enforce con-
tribution must be commenced within one year after the judgment has
become final "by lapse of time for appeal or after appellate review."
This follows through on the basic theme of the Act which imposes a
one year statute of limitations on attempts to recover contribution.
1 7 3
However, the beginning of this one year period is not as easily dis-
covered as is the beginning day of the year's limitation imposed by sec-
tion 2307.32(C).
To begin with, the term judgment as used in section 2307.32(B)
must be read in conjunction with Civil Rule 54.174 Thus, the judgment
itself must be a final order; that is, an order which meets one or more
of the four tests for finality set down in Ohio Revised Code section
2505.02,175 as well as the test for finality included in Ohio Civil Rule
54(B).17 6  A judgment meeting these tests becomes a final order when
it is filed with the clerk of the court for journalization. 177 This act of
filing with the clerk for journalization is more commonly referred to as
the "entry" of the judgment, even though the clerk may not physically
enter the judgment in the journal until a later date.
Although an action for contribution commenced within one year of
the date of journalization will be timely, the date of journalization is not
the beginning date of the one year period. Rather, the beginning date
171 Richley v. Leichty, 44 Ohio App. 2d 359, 363, 338 N.E.2d 789, 792 (1975).
171 See id.
173 See Otno REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.32(C) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)), which
mandates that the separate action for contribution must be brought within one year after
payment in the event of settlement without suit, and within one year of the agreement to
pay in the event of a settlement after suit has been commenced, but before judgment.
174 As stated in Omo R. Civ. P. 54(A): " 'Judgment' as used in these rules includes a
decree and any order from which an appeal lies."
175 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 (Page 1954) stipulates:
An order affecting a substantial right in an action which in effect determines the
action and prevents a judgment, an order affecting a substantial right made in a
special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment, or
an order vacating or setting aside a judgment and ordering a new trial is a final
order which may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without
retrial.
176 Ouso R. Civ. P. 54(B) applies to actions involving multiple claims and/or multiple
parties. In such an action, a "judgment" which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or
the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties will not be a final order unless
the judgment entry contains an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay.
177 Id. 58: "A judgment is effective only when filed with the clerk for journalization."
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is the day after the day the judgment becomes final 7" either by lapse
of time for appeal, or after appellate review.
Normally, a judgment becomes final by lapse of time for appeal if no
notice of appeal is filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days
after the judgment has been joumalized. 179 Thus, in the normal case,
the first day of the year in which the suit for contribution must be
commenced will be the 31st day after the judgment has been journal-
ized. The year will actually be one year and 30 days from the date of
journalization. However, a timely made motion for a new trial or for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict will suspend the time for filing
a notice of appeal; 80 but a timely made motion for relief from judg-
ment will not, 81 nor will a motion for reconsideration,8 2 unless the
latter motion can properly be viewed as a motion for a new trial.' s3
Thus, if one or more appropriate "finality-suspending" motions are
made, the finality of the judgment is suspended until an order has been
entered either granting or denying such motions, and a full 30 days in
which to file a notice of appeal commences to run, computed from the
date the last of such orders is entered. 84 Suppose, for example, that
"' Id. 6(A) states:
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed . . . by any applicable
statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of
time begins to run shall not be included.
And Otuo REV. CODE ANN. § 1.14 (Page 1969) provides:
The time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed
by excluding the first and including the last day; . . .
Thus, the first day of the year in which to commence the separate action for contribution
will be the day following the day on which the judgment becomes final.
119 Omo R. App. P. 4(A):
In a civil case the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk
of the trial court within thirty days of the date of the entry of the judgment or
order appealed from.
180 Id.; Kauder v. Kauder, 38 Ohio St. 2d 265, 267, 313 N.E.2d 797, 798 (1974):
In addition to establishing the 30-day period for appeal, App. R. 4(A) provides
the exclusive means by which the running of that time may be suspended. The
operation of the rule may be tolled by either the filing of a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, pursuant to Civ. R. 50(B), or the filing of a motion
for a new trial under Civ. R. 59.
'8' OHio R. Civ. P. 60(B); Kauder v. Kauder, 38 Ohio St. 2d 265, 267n., 313 N.E. 2d
797, 798n. (1974):
In specific terms, Rule 60(B) provides: "A motion [filed hereunder] . . . does
not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation." Thus, a Civ. R.
60(B) motion, by whatever name, does not toll the time in which an appeal can
be filed.
182 Kauder v. Kauder, 38 Ohio St. 2d 265, 313 N.E.2d 797 (1974); Taray v. Sadoff,
71 Ohio Op. 2d 203, 331 N.E.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1974). Actually, a motion for reconsidera-
tion or a motion for rehearing does not lie if the "judgment" is a final order, since such
motions may only be directed to interlocutory orders. LaBarbera v. Batsch, 117 Ohio
App. 272, 182 N.E.2d 632 (1962). However, these motions are often mistakenly used as
a substitute for the more appropriate motion for new trial, motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict, or motion for relief from judgment; and usually with fatal
results. See Kauder v. Kauder, 38 Ohio St. 2d 265, 313 N.E.2d 797 (1974); Taray v.
Sadoff, 71 Ohio Op. 2d 203, 331 N.E.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1974); Browne, The Fatal Pause
- Summary Judgment and the Motion for Reconsideration, 44 CLEv. B.J., Nov. 1972, at 7.
183 North Royalton Educ. Ass'n. v. Board of Educ., 41 Ohio App. 2d 209, 325 N.E.2d
901 (1974).
184 Omo R. App. P. 4(A).
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the original judgment was journalized on the 31st of August. Normally,
such a judgment would become "final by lapse of time for appeal" on
the 30th of September. But if a motion for a new trial was served by
the 14th of September, the "time for appeal" would be suspended.
Suppose further that an order overruling the motion for a new trial is
entered or journalized on the 30th of September. Now, the 30-day "time
for appeal" begins to run with the 1st day of October, and continues to
run through the 30th of October. Thus, the first day of the year in
which to commence the suit for contribution is the 31st of October, as
this is the first day after the original judgment has become "final by
lapse of time for appeal." Therefore, in a given case, some calculations
may be required to determine just when the magic year begins and ends.
If an appeal is commenced, when is the judgment final "after ap-
pellate review?" In part, this answer depends upon what the appellate
court does; and, in part, it depends upon whether the phrase "by lapse
of time for appeal" is applicable only to the original judgment or whether
it also applies to the judgment of the appellate court. Assuming that a
timely appeal has been taken, there are a number of possible permuta-
tions which will produce somewhat different calculations. All of these
permutations boil down to one of two basic options: The appellate court
will either remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings, or
it will enter a final judgment at the appellate level. As a general rule,
then, we may start with the proposition that a judgment is final after
appellate review either after the appellate court has entered final judg-
ment, or after the trial court has fully complied with the order of remand.
This will be true unless the original judgment has been vacated by the
appellate court, or it has ordered the trial court to vacate the original
judgment and take further proceedings, such as a new trial. In that
event there no longer exists a final judgment from which the tortfeasor
can seek contribution.
Now we must deal with the second aspect of the problem. Does the
"lapse of time for appeal" apply in cases where there has already been
one appeal? As a practical matter, the chance for further appellate
review in the supreme court is slim, but the possibility does exist, and
the losing party has 30 days from the entry of the appellate judgment
to seek review by the supreme court.'8 5 If the supreme court does hear
the appeal, it may undo what the trial court and the court of appeals have
done. Accordingly, the better view would require the application of
"lapse of time for appeal" to an appellate judgment as well as a trial
court judgment. Therefore, the judgment is "final . . . after appellate
review" when the appellate court has entered a final order and the 30
days in which to appeal from that order has lapsed without an appeal
being attempted, or when the trial court has fully complied with the
order of remand from the appellate court, and the time in which to
185 OfHo Sup. CT. R. PrAc. I § I(A) provides:
The notice of appeal from a Court of Appeals must be filed in the court from
which the case is appealed within thirty days from the entry of the judgment or
final order appealed from . ...
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appeal from the appellate court's order of remand has elapsed without
an appeal being attempted.
The phrase "final by lapse of time for appeal or after appellate
review" not only identifies the first day of the year within which the
separate suit for contribution must be brought, but also defines the
earliest date such suit may be commenced. To put it less enigmatically,
the separate suit for contribution may not be brought until the original
judgment has become final. In actions for contribution, a judgment is a
prerequisite to the separate action since it is the judgment which estab-
lishes the amount of common liability. Thus, section 2307.32(B) pre-
supposes the existence of a final judgment. The judgment must not
only be final in the sense that it is appealable, it must also be final
in the sense that it is not likely to be changed. In other words, it must
be either "final by lapse of time for appeal or after appellate review."
An example will illustrate this proposition. Suppose that after judg-
ment is entered against Tortfeasor, he timely serves a motion for a new
trial. However, since he forgot to also move for a stay of proceedings to
enforce the judgment, Claimant executes upon his property, and obtains
enough to fully satisfy the judgment. Thereafter, but before the court
has passed on the motion for a new trial, Tortfeasor commences his
separate action against Contributor. But how can that action logically
go forward? It is based on the original judgment, but until the motion
for a new trial has been disposed of, it cannot be known whether that
judgment will remain in existence or not, for if the motion is granted, the
original judgment will be vacated. Thus, the very basis for the suit may
vanish before the suit is concluded. 86 Indeed, a worse result is possible,
albeit unlikely. Suppose the separate suit for contribution is concluded
in Tortfeasor's favor by a motion for summary judgment. Thereafter,
Tortfeasor's earlier motion for a new trial is granted, the original judg-
ment vacated, and a new trial ordered. What is now to be done with the
judgment in the separate suit for contribution? Accordingly, where
the separate suit for contribution is premised on a judgment in the
claimant's favor solely against the tortfeasor seeking contribution,
that suit may not be commenced until the judgment has become both
186 As a matter of fact, the basis for the suit has vanished with the service of the motion
for a new trial. As noted in the text, the essential prerequisite to the separate suit is a
final order. But the service of a timely motion for a new trial suspends the finality of
the original decision. Therefore, there is no "judgment" in existence at the time the
separate suit is commenced, and Tortfeasor has no claim upon which relief can be granted.
Since it is unlikely, however, that any of this will appear from the face of the complaint
for contribution, and since the court in the contribution action may not take judicial
notice of what occurred or is occurring in the action between Claimant and Tortfeasor the
action is not subject to an Oio R. Civ. P. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Geradot v. Parrish, 44 Ohio App. 2d 293, 338
N.E.2d 531 (1975). If that defense is to be raised at all, it will probably have to be
raised as an affirmative defense in the answer and determined on an OHio R. Civ. P.
12(D) motion for preliminary hearing or by an OHIO R. Civ. P. 56 motion for summary
judgment. The Rule 12(D) motion for preliminary hearing, like the Rule 56 motion for
summary judgment, may be supported by affidavits and other documentary evidence in
testimonial form. Jurko v. Jobs Europe Agency, 43 Ohio App. 2d 79, 334 N.E.2d 478
(1975). Thus, either motion may be used to put the necessary facts before the court. But
see note 187 infra.
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final for purpose of appeal and final by lapse of time for appeal or
after appellate review. A separate suit commenced prior to that time is
premature, and is vulnerable to a motion to strike from the files.
There is at least one possible situation, however, where the problem
of inconsistency between a motion directed to the original judgment
and the separate suit for contribution cannot be solved by invoking the
doctrine of prematurity. Suppose a judgment and the satisfaction of the
judgment by levy of execution or otherwise. After the time for appeal
has lapsed, Tortfeasor commences his separate suit for contribution.
Shortly thereafter, he discovers a ground which would warrant the vaca-
tion of the original judgment, and moves for relief from judgment un-
der the provisions of Ohio Civil Rule 60(B). Before the suit for contri-
bution is determined, the motion for relief from judgment is granted,
the original judgment is vacated and a new trial ordered. Obviously,
the suit for contribution cannot go forward since the very foundation
for that suit has now disappeared. Tortfeasor should obtain the dismis-
sal of the contribution suit by one of the means provided in Ohio Civil
Rule 41(A), but if he fails to do so, Contributor may move for summary
judgment on the ground that Tortfeasor no longer has a claim upon
which relief can be granted.1
7
There remains a problem that is common to both the third party
claim and the separate suit after judgment. Suppose that the statute
of limitations on Claimant's action has run before the third party action
or the separate suit after judgment is commenced by Tortfeasor. Clear-
ly, Claimant can no longer proceed against Contributor because her ac-
tion is barred by the statute of limitations. Will the running of that
statute also bar Tortfeasor's claim for contribution? The answer is in the
negative. As stated in Markey v. Skog, the right to contribution does
not accrue until Tortfeasor has paid more than his proportionate share
of the common liability. Tortfeasor cannot be deprived of his inchoate
right of contribution even though Claimant has lost the right of direct
suit against Contributor.'
What is it that preserves the right to contribution after the statute
117 There is some initial difficulty with the thesis that there is no longer a claim upon
which relief can be granted. As noted at the commencement of this Article, the two
essential prerequisites for contribution are common liability in fact, as opposed to judi-
cially declared liability, and payment of more than a proportionate share of that liability.
In this situation, and in the previous situation involving the motion for a new trial, see
note 186 supra, payment has been made through the levy of execution and remains paid.
Thus, the key element is common liability. In both situations, the judicial declaration of
liability has either been withdrawn or suspended, but this has no effect on liability in
fact; that liability exists independently of the judicial declaration of liability. Accord-
ingly, if liability in fact does exist, Tortfeasor still has a claim upon which relief can be
granted since that liability has conjoined with the payment through the levy of execution.
That does not affect the conclusion that the separate suit for contribution does not present
a claim upon which relief can be granted, however, since the separate suit for contribution
was premised on the judicially declared common liability and not upon the common
liability in fact. Thus, where the judicial declaration of liability fails, the claim based
upon it fails as well. In other words, Tortfeasor may have a claim for contribution
based on liability in fact, but that is not the claim he has presented in his separate suit
for contribution.
"1s 129 N.J. Super. 192, 200-01, 322 A.2d 513, 518 (1974).
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of limitations has run on the injured party's claim? There is no unanim-
ity on the point, but Rhode Island has the better answer: The right of
contribution is a derivative right and not a new cause of action;8 9
subrogation is the means by which the paying tortfeasor obtains the
cause of action from the claimant. When the tortfeasor satisfies
the common liability by payment he or she is subrogated to the claim-
ant's cause of action as it exists at the time payment is made.1 90 Thus,
if suit was commenced on that cause of action before the statute of
limitations had run, the cause of action remains alive throughout the
subsequent proceedings; and, through legal subrogation, is transferred
to the tortfeasor as a live cause of action when payment is made. 9'
On the other hand, if Claimant's cause of action was barred because suit
thereon had not been timely commenced, or if no suit at all had been
commenced on that cause of action and the statute has run, the paying
tortfeasor is a mere volunteer, and upon payment is subrogated to a
dead cause of action. Accordingly, he or she would have no derivative
claim with which to seek contribution. Therefore, the statute of limita-
tions applicable to the claimant's cause of action will bar a third party
claim or a separate suit for contribution only if the running of the statute
would have barred the cause of action itself at the time the paying tort-
feasor satisfied the common liability. Such will never be the case if the
claimant properly commenced suit before the statute of limitations had
run.
C. Suit against Tortfeasor and Contributor
Here, Claimant has joined both Tortfeasor and Contributor as parties
defendant. Again, we are concerned with Tortfeasor's rights against
Contributor, and the options available to him for contribution. Much
that has been said above will be fully applicable here. Here we shall
concentrate on the options which are peculiar to a suit against all of the
tortfeasors jointly.
(1) The Cross-Claim. The first option open to Tortfeasor is the
cross-claim against his co-defendant, Contributor. As Ohio Civil Rule
13(G) provides, a cross-claim asserts that a co-party "is or may be liable
to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action
against the cross-claimant."' 92
Thus, Civil Rule 13(G) permits a cross-claim for contribution against
a co-defendant to the same extent that Civil Rule 14(A) permitted a
third party claim for contribution against a tortfeasor who was not a
party to the action. Accordingly, all that has been said with respect to
the third party claim is equally applicable here.
189 Rowe v. John C. Motter Printing Press Co., 273 F. Supp. 363, (D.R.I. 1967);
Cacchillo v. H. Leach Mach. Co., 111 R.I. 573, 305 A.2d 541 (1973).
900 The more traditional way of putting it is to say that the subrogee of a claim stands
in the shoes of the assignor or subrogor, and succeeds to all the rights and remedies of
the latter. Inter Ins. Exch. v. Wagstaff, 144 Ohio St. 457, 59 N.E.2d 373 (1945).
"I Am. Ins. Group v. McCowin, 7 Ohio App. 2d 62, 218 N.E.2d 746 (1966).
192 Onio R. Civ. P. 13(G).
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(2) The Post-judgment Motion. Where the tortfeasors have been
joined as parties defendant, and where judgment has been entered
against them, section 2307.32(A) provides a unique device by which one
of the tortfeasors may obtain a judgment for contribution against the
other. That section provides that contribution may be enforced in the
same action "by motion upon notice to all parties."19 3
This provision is, of course, taken from the Uniform Act, 194 which
in turn is premised on the former New York statute. 9 5 Although the
Commissioners' Comment states that the provision "appears to have
worked well and no serious objection to it has developed,"'9' New
York has dropped it, and has substituted the more traditional methods
of determining a right of contribution. 197
As far as Ohio law is concerned, the proceeding is somewhat akin
to a special statutory proceeding, but it is not quite that, since it is not
begun by petition and because the judicial inquiry sought is not essen-
tially independent of the principal action. 198 Rather, since it is begun by
motion rather than by petition, it would appear to be a summary pro-
ceeding in an action after judgment. 19 9 Being summary in nature, such
a proceeding does not require the issuance of process, hearing, findings
of fact, or the elaborate process of a civil suit.20 0  However, if the pro-
ceeding is to be used to best advantage, care must be taken to lay a
proper foundation for it in the principal action. This can best be done
by employing interrogatories to the jury or, if the case is tried to the
court, by requesting findings of fact by the court. Either will be binding
193 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.32(A) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)).
194 UNIFORM CONRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEAsORs Acr, 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED
88-89 (1975).
1'- N.Y. Civ. PRvc. LAW & R. § 1401 (McKinney 1963):
Where a money judgment has been recovered jointly against defendants in an
action for a personal injury or for property damage, each defendant who has paid
more than his pro rata share shall be entitled to contribution from the other
defendants with respect to the excess paid over and above his pro rata share;
provided, however, that no defendant shall be compelled to pay to any other
such defendant an amount greater than his own pro rata share of the entire judg-
ment. Recovery may be had in a separate action or a judgment in the original
action against a defendant who has appeared may be entered on motion made on
notice in the original action.
196 UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS Acr, 12 UNIFORM LAWs ANNOTATED 89
(1975).
191 N.Y. Ctv. PRAc. LAW & R. § 1401 (1963), as amended §§ 1401, 1403 (McKinney
Supp. 1976-77). Effective Sept. 1, 1974, the provision was dropped from Section 1401,
and the methods of obtaining contribution were transferred to Section 1403, which now
reads:
A cause of action for contribution may be asserted in a separate action or by cross-
claim, counterclaim or third-party claim in a pending action.
118 In re Estate of Wyckoff, 166 Ohio St. 354, 142 N.E.2d 660 (1957).
119 See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 (Page 1954), which identifies such a pro-
ceeding as one from which an appeal may be taken if the order made therein affects a
substantial right.
200 State ex rel. Civil Rights Comm'n v. Gunn, 45 Ohio St. 2d 262, 344 N.E.2d 327
(1976).
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upon the defendants in determining their right to contribution according
to section 2307.32(E).2 0 1
Clearly, this provision was intended to supplement section 2307.32
(A), and to provide the foundation for the summary proceeding upon
application described in that section. The combination of these two
sections, and their application to actions in which the tortfeasors have
been joined as defendants make the common liability and the percentage
of fault determinative issues for the purpose of Civil Rule 49(B). Thus,
there should be no difficulty in employing the interrogatory procedure
provided in that Rule.
Of course, this summary proceeding may only be used against co-
defendants who have become co-judgment debtors by reason of a judg-
ment in the claimant's favor. Further - and the New York cases de-
cided under the former New York statute make this point clear - the
summary proceeding may only be employed by the co-judgment debtor
who has either satisfied the entire judgment or at least paid more than
his or her proportionate share of that judgment.20 2 This is in accord
with the provisions of section 2307.31(A), which provide that the right of
contribution exists only in favor of the tortfeasor who has paid more than
his or her proportionate share of the common liability.
The judgment in the original action must be a true judgment, that is,
it must be a final order for purposes of appeal. But apart from that,
the Act imposes no time limitations on the motion; the co-judgment
debtor intending to employ the motion need not wait until the judgment
has become "'final by lapse of time for appeal or after appellate review."
Neither is there any express statute of limitations applicable to the mak-
ing of the motion; if the court properly obtained jurisdiction of the de-
fendants in the original action, it retains that jurisdiction after judg-
ment, and the original action is deemed to continue for the purpose of
enforcing contribution by means of the summary proceeding.2° Thus,
the motion may be made after the original judgment has been affirmed
on appeal, and this even though the co-judgment debtor from whom
contribution is sought has left the state and is no longer subject to ser-
vice of process.204  Indeed, at least one New York court has held that
the motion for judgment may be made and granted against a co-judg-
201 See note 68 supra.
202 As said in Jones v. All Boro Car Leasing, Inc., 67 Misc. 2d 567, 569, 325 N.Y.S.2d
535, 537 (N.Y. City Ct. 1971):
When the defendant against whom contribution is sought has appeared in the
original action, the cases have recognized that a motion compelling such action
is proper provided the supporting papers clearly establish that the conditions of
Section 1401 have been met. To wit: the movant must establish that lie has
satisfied the judgment or paid more than his pro rata share.
202 Ohlquist v. Nordstrom, 143 Misc. 502, 504, 257 N.Y.S. 711, 713 (Sup. Ct. 1932),
aff'd mem., 261 N.Y.S. 1039, aff'd mem., (App. Div.), 262 N.Y. 696, 188 N.E. 12-5 (1933).
The lower court noted:
The statute does not say that the notice of motion is to be served personally upon
the codefendant because of the fact that his appearance in the action had ceased.
A proper construction is that the action continues because there is something that
remains to be done and the authority of the attorneys under the original ap-
pearance continues.
204 Id.
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ment debtor while that co-judgment debtor's appeal is pending in the
appellate court.20 5 Ohio law might permit the making of the motion
under this circumstance, but it would not permit a ruling on the motion
unless and until the appellate court remanded the matter to the trial
court for that purpose.206 In any event, the New York courts have held
that the reversal of the original judgment automatically reversed an
earlier order granting a motion for contribution.20 7 This appears to be
a logical result and, by extension, should apply whenever the original
judgment is vacated pursuant to a motion for a new trial, a motion for
relief from judgment, or the like.208 Since there is no time limit be-
yond which the motion for judgment cannot be made, and since the
vacation or reversal of the original judgment will automatically reverse
an order granting the motion for contribution, it may be wise to wait
until the original judgment becomes final before making the motion.
Finally, section 2307.32(A) requires that notice of the motion for
contribution be given to all parties to the action. Since the proceeding
is initiated by motion, we may assume that the usual rules of motion
practice govern. That being so, notice may be given either by serving
a copy of the written notice of the hearing of the motion where that
procedure is still in vogue, or, in accordance with more recent practice,
by serving a copy of the motion itself, upon all parties to the action.21
Because the court has jurisdiction of the parties, service may be made
under the provisions of Ohio Civil Rule 5(B) rather than under the pro-
visions of Rules 4 through 4.6. If the party to be served is not repre-
sented by an attorney, service will be made on that party; otherwise,
service will be made upon the party's attorney of record, unless the
court otherwise orders. 210 Service will ordinarily be made by regular
205 Stem v. Yasuna, 44 Misc. 2d 185, 253 N.Y.S.2d 439 (Sup. Ct. 1964). But see
Salvatore v. City of New York, 184 Misc. 823, 55 N.Y.S.2d 463 (N.Y. City Ct. 1945).
206 Majnaric v. Mainaric, 46 Ohio App. 2d 157, 347 N.E.2d 552 (1975).
207 Stern v. Yasuna, 44 Misc. 2d 185, 253 N.Y.S.2d 439 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Mulligan v.
New York Univ., 254 App. Div. 107, 3 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1938).
208 Since a true judgment - that is, a final order - is a prerequisite to the motion for
relief from judgment, it would seem to logically follow that the motion cannot be made
while a motion for a new trial or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is
pending since either of those motions will suspend the finality of the original judgment.
200 The phrase "all parties to the action" means precisely what it says; notice through
service must be given to all of the plaintiffs as well as all of the defendants. As the
Commissioners' Comment to The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act explains:
The requirement of notice to all of the parties makes it necessary to give notice
to the plaintiff as well as to joint tortfeasor defendants. This may on first impres-
sion seem unnecessary but it is done to give a plaintiff who may have been only
partially paid, some protection against the exhausting of the assets to satisfy a
contribution claim before the plaintiff (judgment creditor) has collected the
balance on his judgment.
12 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 89 Comment(b)(1975). Even if the act did not require
notice to "all parties," OHfo R. Civ. P. 5(A) would, since it requires that a copy of the
motion be served "upon each of the parties." See also id. 7(B)(1).
210 Service on the attorney of record is warranted by the presumption that the attorney
has authority to receive notice on behalf of the client. There is authority for the proposi-
tion, however, that an attorney's authority to receive notice on behalf of the client ends
with the rendition of a final judgment. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 12 Ohio App. 63 (1919).
But such a rule is out of harmony with modern practice as provided by the Ohio Rules of
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mail directed to the attorney's office, or by handing the copy of the
motion to the attorney.2 1 1
A slight exception to these rules must be made in the case of defen-
dants who are in default for failure to appear. 212  Ohio Civil Rule 5(A)
does not require service on such parties unless the pleading to be served
asserts a new or additional claim for relief against them. Technically,
the motion for judgment does not fall within the ambit of this Rule since
it is not a pleading. Further, it may be questioned whether the claim
for contribution is the type of "new or additional claim for relief" con-
templated by the Rule. However, the better construction is that the
Rule applies by analogy. Accordingly, service of the motion must be
made on these parties as well. But Civil Rule 5(B) service will not suf-
fice in this instance; Civil Rule 5(A) specifies that the document as-
serting the new or additional claim for relief must be served "in the
manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4 through Rule 4.6."
These Civil Rules require certified mail service on the party, though
personal service or residence service may also be authorized. Ordinary
mail service will not suffice,2 1 3 unless certified mail service is un-
claimed, or has been refused.
(3) Separate Action after Judgment. Although either the cross-
claim or the post-judgment motion for contribution may be more con-
venient, Tortfeasor is not required to employ them; he may, if he so de-
sires, bring a separate action for contribution after the judgment against
the co-defendants becomes final. The separate action has been dis-
cussed above, and we need not repeat that discussion here.
D. Suit by Claimant and Contributor against Tortfeasor
Here, Claimant and Contributor have joined as parties plaintiff against
Tortfeasor. Because we have stipulated that Contributor and Tortfeasor
were both concurrently negligent in causing Claimant's injuries, we know
that Contributor does not have a valid action against Tortfeasor. But
that was an objective view of the matter. Subjectively, both Contributor
Civil Procedure. Those Rules recognize the existence of a number of post-judgment
motions, and they mandate that those motions are to be served upon the attorneys of
record for "each of the parties," unless the court otherwise orders. Thus it may be
concluded that an attorney of record is authorized to receive notice on behalf of the
client even after judgment unless the client has expressly discharged the attorney, or
unless the attorney has recorded his withdrawal from the case with the court. This is in
accord with the New York decisions. See Ohlquist v. Nordstrom, 143 Misc. 502, 257
N.Y.S. 711 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
211 In appropriate circumstances service can be made by leaving a copy of the motion
with the clerk of courts, by leaving it at the attorney's office, or by leaving it at the
attorney's dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age
and discretion residing therein.
212 There -is no doubt that a default judgment against one tortfeasor will support a
motion for judgment by the other. As it is said in GTE Automatic Elec. v. ARC Indus.,
47 Ohio St. 2d 146, 149-50, 351 N.E.2d 113, 115 (1976):
Regardless of whatever else may be said of a default judgment, it is a judgment.
It is as good as any other judgment. It is a final determination of the rights of
the parties.
213 Yonally v. Yonally, 45 Ohio App. 2d 122, 341 N.E.2d 602 (1974). Motion to
certify the record was overruled by the Supreme Court of Ohio, October 4, 1974.
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and Tortfeasor may legitimately feel that neither was personally negli-
gent in the circumstances, and the sole cause of the injuries was the negli-
gence of the other. Thus, we may postulate that Contributor is acting
in good faith when she sues Tortfeasor for negligence, and we may pos-
tulate that Tortfeasor is acting in good faith when he denies that negli-
gence and avers that the negligence of Contributor was the sole cause of
the injury to both Claimant and Contributor. We may also assume that
Tortfeasor will deny his negligence in his answer, and will assert, as
against Contributor, the affirmative defense of contributory negligence.
Under these circumstances, and apart from settlement and separate ac-
tion thereafter, what are Tortfeasor's options for obtaining contribution
from Contributor?
(1) The Cross-Claim. Under the circumstances which we have de-
scribed, the cross-claim will not lie since Tortfeasor and Contributor
are not co-parties defendant.21 4  Therefore, the cross-claim may be
eliminated as a viable option.
(2) The Counterclaim. In our situation, the counterclaim comes to
mind as the most logical procedural device for presenting the claim
for contribution. Indeed, the New York statute specifically authorizes
the use of a counterclaim for this purpose, 21 5 and at least one other state
has permitted it. 21 6 However, Ohio's Civil Rule 13(A) specifies:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the
time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any oppos-
ing party, . . .217
Now Tortfeasor will not "have" a claim for contribution until after
he has paid more than his proportionate share of any judgment Claim-
ant may obtain against him, and this will not be the case at the time
he serves his answer. Therefore, since he does not "have" a claim for
contribution "at the time of serving the pleading," he may not employ
the counterclaim for the purpose of obtaining contribution.
However, Ohio Civil Rule 13(E) permits a claim to be presented by
supplemental pleadings if the claim matured after service of the pleading.
Assuming the consent of the court, the right combination of circum-
stances may permit Tortfeasor to present his claim for contribution by
way of a counterclaim contained in a supplemental pleading. Suppose,
for example, that Tortfeasor settled Claimant's claim in full, and there-
by paid more than his proportionate share of the common liability.
At that point, his claim for contribution matured, and if Contributor's
action against him was still pending, he could serve a supplemental
answer which would contain his counterclaim for contribution. On the
other hand, suppose that Claimant's action proceeded to judgment before
Contributor's action. If Tortfeasor satisfies that judgment, and thereby
pays more than his proportionate share, and if Contributor's action is still
"14 Danner v. Anskis, 256 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1958).
215 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW & R. § 1403 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77).
216 Petersen v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1970).
217 OHIo R. CIV. P. 13(A) (emphasis added).
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pending, Tortfeasor may again use the supplemental answer containing
a counterclaim for contribution. But here Tortfeasor must be careful.
As we noted above, when a judgment is the foundation for a claim to
contribution, the judgment must be a final order. In the situation we
have just described, the judgment in favor of Claimant will not be a
final order unless the' judgment entry contains an express finding by
the court that there is no just reason for delay in making the judgment
final.21 8  Thus, Tortfeasor must insure that the judgment entry con-
tains this magic language.
Although the language of Ohio Civil Rule 13(A) prohibits a direct
counterclaim for contribution, there may be a way of avoiding that pro-
hibition provided the ethical admonition contained in Civil Rule 11219
can be observed. As an initial premise, we must assume that Tortfeasor
believes in good faith that he is not guilty of negligence which proxi-
mately caused the injury and damage of which Claimant and Contribu-
tor complain, and that that injury and damage was proximately caused
by the negligence of Contributor or, at the worst, by the concurrent
negligence of Tortfeasor and Contributor. If he believes that in good
faith, his first step is to tender a share of the defense of Claimant's
action to Contributor (in a sense, he will vouch in Contributor). If
Contributor rejects the tender, the next step will be a careful structuring
of Tortfeasor's answer to Contributor's portion of the complaint. That
answer should contain a denial of Contributor's allegations of negligence,
and it should also contain, in the alternative, the affirmative defense of
contributory negligence. If Tortfeasor has suffered property damage
and/or personal injury in the collision, the answer will also contain a
counterclaim against Contributor alleging that Contributor's negligence
was the proximate cause of that damage or injury, and praying for com-
pensatory damages therefor. Such a counterclaim will be valid under
the provisions of Ohio Civil Rule 13(A). Indeed, that rule mandates
that such a claim be presented by way of counterclaim since it arises
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of Con-
tributor's claim against Tortfeasor, and does not require for its adjudica-
tion the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction.
Under the provisions of Ohio Civil Rule 18(A),220 there will be added
to that claim for money damages a second alternate claim. In essence,
this second claim will allege the tender to Contributor of the defense of
Claimant's action and Contributor's rejection of that tender. In addition
it will allege the substance of Claimant's and Contributor's claim against
21S Id. 54(B).
219 In pertinent part, Rule 11 provides:
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
OHIO R. Civ. P. 11.
220 Id. 18(A) states:
A party asserting a claim to relief as . . . [a] counterclaim . . . may join, either
as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal or equitable, as he
has against an opposing party.
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Tortfeasor, and Tortfeasor's defense of contributory negligence asserted
against Contributor. It will then ask the court to declare that if Tort-
feasor is found liable to Claimant in negligence, but not liable to Con-
tributor because of Contributor's contributory negligence, that the negli-
gence of Tortfeasor and Contributor was concurrent, and that by reason
thereof, Contributor will be obligated to Tortfeasor in contribution if
Tortfeasor pays more than his proportionate share of the common liabil-
ity to Claimant. In a nutshell, this second alternate claim is a claim for
a declaratory judgment to the effect that if Tortfeasor pays more than
his proportionate share of the common liability to Claimant, Contrib-
utor will be liable to him in contribution.
Is such a claim for declaratory judgment valid, and may the claim
be presented in this manner? Turning to the second question first, and
assuming the claim's validity, it is probably safe to say that such a claim
could not be presented by way of counterclaim if it was the only claim
available to Tortfeasor. 22 1 However, since Tortfeasor has a valid coun-
terclaim for money damages, Civil Rule 18(A) permits this claim for
declaratory judgment to ride "piggy-back" on the claim for damages.
Thus, it may be presented in this manner.
Whether it is a valid claim for declaratory judgment or not is another
matter, and one that is fairly debatable. The two essential questions
are: whether such a claim presents a real controversy between the
parties; and whether a declaratory judgment will terminate the contro-
versy giving rise to the proceedings. 222 No doubt the declaratory judg-
ment in Tortfeasor's favor would terminate the controversy to the same
extent as a judgment on a cross-claim or a third party claim, so the sec-
ond question can be answered in the affirmative. But is there a real
controversy? The court in Bilyeu v. Motorists Mutual Ins. Co. stated
that the granting or denial of declaratory relief would not lie where the
controversy was contingent. 223  In our example the controversy is
contingent upon a finding of negligence against Tortfeasor, a finding
of contributory negligence against Contributor, and a finding that the
negligence of each concurred to proximately cause Claimant's injury.
All of these contingencies may never occur, and in this respect this
claim differs from the cross-claim or the third party claim where there
is but one contingency - the liability of the cross-claimant or the third
party claimant to the plaintiff. A determination whether to grant or
deny declaratory relief is one of degree, 224 resting within the sound dis-
cretion of the court. If there are too many contingencies, the facts
upon which the relief is to be granted become hypothetical, and the
judgment becomes nothing more than an advisory opinion. Are there
221 This is so because it is essentially contingent in nature, and O()no R. Civ. P. 13(A)
allows only mature claims.
222 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2721.07 (Page 1954):
Courts of record may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree
when such judgment or decree would not terminate the uncertainty or contro-
versy giving rise to the proceedings.
223 36 Ohio St. 2d 35, 37, 303 N.E.2d 871, 873 (1973).
224 Id.
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too many contingencies here? In the opinion of the author there are
not, but the ultimate answer must be left to the courts.
(3) Impleader. As a general proposition, a third party claim is not
available to Tortfeasor because Contributor is already a party to the ac-
tion.225  However, Sporia v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines226  sug-
gests a way of avoiding this restriction. The facts of Sporia are similar
to our own hypothetical. There was an action to recover damages for
injuries suffered by Sporia and Kosana as the result of a collision be-
tween an automobile driven by Sporia, in which Kosana was riding as a
passenger, and a Greyhound bus. Sporia and Kosana had joined in the
same action as parties plaintiff. Under the provisions of Rule 21 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22  Greyhound moved to have Sporia's
claim severed from that of Kosana. In support of its motion, it pointed
out that it had a possible claim for contribution against Sporia, but in
the present posture of the case it might lose that claim because there
was no procedural method by which it could be presented. It further
pointed out that if the claims were severed, Sporia would become a
technical "stranger" to Kosana's action, and Sporia could then be im-
pleaded in that action as a third party defendant. The trial court denied
the motion,2 8 but the appellate court reversed holding that the claims
of the two plaintiffs, Sporia and Kosana, were separate and distinct and
therefore severable.22 9  The court noted that severance of the two
claims would work no injustice on any of the parties, but would permit
Greyhound's right of contribution from Sporia which might otherwise
be lost.
(4) The Post-judgment Motion. In our situation, the post-judgment
motion provided in section 2307.32(A) will not be available since Claim-
ant will not have obtained a judgment against both Tortfeasor and Con-
tributor;230 if Claimant prevails, her judgment will be against Tort-
feasor only. If Claimant could cross-claim against Contributor, and
prevail, then the language of section 2307.32(A) might be stretched to
accommodate Tortfeasor, but under the accepted interpretation of Ohio
Civil Rule 13(G), Claimant and Contributor may not cross-claim
against each other because they are not in a defensive posture in the
lawsuit. 23'
225 In pertinent part, Omo R. Civ. P. 14(A) states:
[A] defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and com-
plaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action ....
(Emphasis added.)
226 143 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1944).
227 FED. R. CIv. P. 21. In this respect the Federal Rule and OHo R. Civ. P. 21 are
identical; both provide that "any claim against a party may be severed and proceeded
with separately."
,22 3 F.R.D. 197 (W.D. Pa. 1943).
221 143 F.2d at 106-08.
235 As a prerequisite to the summary proceeding after judgment, OHIo REv. CODE
ANN. § 2307.32(A) (Page Legis. Bull. 389 (1976)) requires that a judgment be "entered
in an action against two or more tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death."
23' Danner v. Anskis, 256 F.2d 123, 124 (3d Cir. 1958). The court held that a cross-
claim may only be instituted by plaintiff against a co-plaintiff when the defendant has
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(5) The Separate Action after Judgment. If Claimant prevails
against Tortfeasor on her claim of negligence, and if Tortfeasor prevails
against Contributor on his affirmative defense of contributory negligence,
then it would appear that Tortfeasor may attempt to obtain contribu-
tion from Contributor by means of the separate action after judgment.
IV. PROBLEMS OF RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
The previous pages have not, by any means, discussed all of the sub-
stantive and procedural ramifications of the Act, but they have dis-
cussed enough to give the reader the flavor of the Act and how it is apt
to be employed. But one very substantial problem remains. The Act
became effective on October 1, 1976, but that does not mean that it
will immediately apply to all cases. It must yet be determined whether
it applies to liability which has been incurred prior to that date, or
whether it applies only to liability which is incurred on or after the 1st of
October. Essentially, there are four situations: (1) liability incurred
and satisfied after October 1, 1976; (2) liability incurred before Octo-
ber 1, 1976, but satisfied after October 1, 1976; (3) liability incurred
and satisfied after October 1, 1975, but before October 1, 1976; and
(4) liability incurred and satisfied before September 1, 1975.
Clearly, the Act applies to the first situation; and, with a few possible
exceptions depending upon just when a judgment becomes final, it is
just as clear that it does not apply to the fourth, since the general one-
year statute of limitations contained in the Act will bar contribution in
cases falling into that category. Thus, the two troublesome situations
are the second and the third, and of these two, the second is the most
troublesome of all.
There are two questions to be answered: May the Act be applied
retrospectively, and if it may not, would its application to the second
and third situations be a retrospective application?
The Ohio Constitution provides, in part, that "The General Assembly
shall have no power to pass retroactive laws."2 32  It has been held,
however, that this prohibition has application only to laws affecting
substantive rights, and has no reference to laws of a remedial nature
providing rules of practice, courses of procedure, or methods of review.
Thus, as far as the Constitutional prohibition is concerned, these latter
laws are applicable to any proceedings conducted after the adoption of
such laws.2 33 While a clear distinction between substantive law and
procedural or remedial law is difficult to frame, it has been said that
generally the substantive law creates duties, rights, and obligations while
procedural law prescribes the methods for enforcing those rights.
234
filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff. The cross-claim must state a claim which is
ancillary to a claim stated in the complaint or counterclaim.
232 OHIO CONST. art. II § 28.
233 Kilbreath v. Rudy, 16 Ohio St. 2d 70, 242 N.E.2d 658 (1968).
234 State ex rel. Holdridge v. Indus. Comm'n, 11 Ohio St. 2d 175, 178, 228 N.E.2d
621, 623 (1967).
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As Kacian v. Illes Constr. Co.2 3 5 explained, substantive laws deal
with questions of liability or the amount of damages; they create "new
wrongs.
An analogy may be drawn between the Contribution Among Tort-
feasors Act and the Wrongful Death Act,236 since both have many
points in common. The common law recognized no right of action for
wrongful death, nor did the Ohio legislature until 1851. In that year,
the General Assembly passed the first Wrongful Death Act, and the Ohio
Supreme Court recognized the wrongful death action as "an innovation
upon the principles of the common law." 237 Since a new cause of ac-
tion was thereby created, the law was viewed as substantive although
the statute also provided the means to remedy the injury.23  Thus,
even though the Wrongful Death Act includes the procedural means
by which the right of action is to be enforced, the whole is substantive
in nature because the procedure is ancillary to the right itself, and it is
the creation of the right which makes the Act substantive. From this it
follows that the Wrongful Death Act could not have been given retro-
active effect without violating the Constitutional injunction against
retroactive laws. 239
When measured by the above standards, it is clear that the Contribu-
tion Among Torfeasors Act also creates a substantive right. The common
law did not recognize such a right, 240 and neither did the Ohio legisla-
ture until the enactment of the Act. Thus, the Contribution Among Tort-
feasors Act must be regarded as an innovation upon the principles of
the common law, 24' and as affording the only civil remedy whereby one
tortfeasor may obtain contribution from another.
Technically, of course, only sections 2307.31(A) through 2307.31(F)
are substantive in nature; sections 2307.31(G) and 2307.32(A) through
2307.32(F) are procedural. However, these last sections are meaning-
less without the substantive sections; they are merely ancillary to sec-
tions 2307.31(A) through 2307.31(F). Their character is derived from
the part to which they are ancillary, and, therefore, the Act as a whole
must be deemed substantive. 242  Accordingly, the Act as a whole is
235 24 Ohio App. 2d 43, 48, 263 N.E.2d 680, 684 (1970), citing Kilbreath v. Rudy,
16 Ohio St. 2d 70, 72-73, 242 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1968).
236 Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2125.01-03 (Page Supp. 1975).
237 Davis v. Justice, 31 Ohio St. 359, 363 (1877).
238 Matz v. Erie-Lackawanna R.R. Co., 2 Ohio App. 2d 136, 140-41, 207 N.E.2d 250,
253 (1965):
In addition to the creation of a cause of action, the statutes provide for a specific
remedy without which the cause of action cannot be maintained in a court of law.
239 Spriggs v. Dredge, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 264, 140 N.E.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1955).
240 Royal Indem. Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N.E. 194 (1930). The syllabus
states:
There is no right of contribution between persons whose concurrent negligence has
made them liable in damages.
24' See note 237 supra and accompanying text.
242 See Matz v. Erie-Lackawanna R.R. Co., 2 Ohio App. 2d 136, 140-41, 207 N.E.2d
250, 253 (1965). More directly on point is Massey v. Sullivan County, 225 Tenn. 132,
134-35, 464 S.W.2d 548, 549 (1971) where it was said:
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subject to article II, section 28 of the Ohio Constitution, and it may not
constitutionally be applied retroactively.
Additionally, Ohio Revised Code section 1.48 provides: "A Statute
is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made
retrospective. '"2 43  There is nothing in the text of section 2307.31 or
2307.32 which expressly makes either or both retrospective. Therefore,
even without the Constitutional prohibition, the Act may not be applied
retrospectively.
But will it be retrospective application if the Act is applied to the
second and third situations described above? In Perk v. City of Euclid,
the Ohio Supreme Court adopted a test for retroactive application:
Any statute that impairs or eliminates vested rights or creates
new obligations with respect to "transactions or considerations
already passed" is retroactive in its application. 244
Clearly, the Act "creates a new obligation" or "imposes a new duty" -
the obligation or duty to pay contribution. But what is the "transac-
tion" in respect to which this new "obligation" or "duty" is created or
imposed?
The difficulty here is that the right to sue for contribution does not
come into existence until two things occur - common liability in fact
and payment of more than a proportionate share of that common lia-
bility. If the "transaction" is complete when the common liability
comes into existence, then the application of the Act to either situation
would obviously be a retrospective application because it would create
a new obligation or impose a new duty with respect to a transaction
which occurred before the effective date of the Act. On the other hand,
if both elements are needed to create the "transaction," the Act would
be retrospective if applied to the third situation, but not retrospective if
applied to the second, since in the second situation the "transaction"
does not come into existence until after the effective date of the Act.
Courts in other jurisdictions have struggled with this same problem,
and in essence, they have concluded that the "transaction" is the occur-
rence which gives rise to the common liability.245 Put another way,
[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the purpose of this Uniform Act is to change
the general rule that there is no contribution among joint tort-feasors and so to
make a substantive change in the law ....
That this purpose is accomplished by an Act which mentions the procedures by
which this primary change is to be availed of, does not change the true nature of
the Act as substantive, and make it procedural.
The draftsmen of the 1939 version of the Uniform Act likewise deemed the Act to be
substantive in nature. In their comment, they said:
The first Subsection of the second Section creates a right of contribution as a
matter of substantive law amongst those who are jointly liable for injuries to the
person or property of another.
16 ALl PROCEEDINGS 348 (1939). The subsection to which reference is made reads:
"'The right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors." 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED
57 (1975).
243 OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1.48 (Page Supp. 1975).
244 17 Ohio St. 2d 4, 8, 244 N.E.2d 475, 477 (1969) citilg Soc'y for the Propagation
of Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767 (No. 13,156) (C.C.D. N.H. 1814).
245 Massey v. Sullivan County, 225 Tenn. 132, 464 S.\A.2d 548 (1971); Robertson v.
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there can be no contribution under the Act if the injury or wrongful
death which gives rise to the common liability occurs prior to the ef-
fective date of the Act. Distefano v. Lamborn2 48 is very like our sec-
ond situation, and best illustrates the thinking of these courts. Some-
what simplified, the facts are these: Distefano was injured in a
construction accident which occurred prior to the effective date of the
Delaware Contribution Act. His employer's workers' compensation car-
rier paid him compensation and became subrogated to his right of action.
As subrogee, the carrier instituted suit against Lamborn and McCormick,
two subcontractors, alleging that their negligence had caused the injuries
to Distefano. While the precise chronology is not clear from the report,
it would appear that the Delaware Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
become effective after this suit was commenced. Relying on the Act,
Lamborn and McCormick commenced a third-party action against
Huber, the owner of the building upon which the construction work was
being performed, in which they sought contribution from Huber in the
event they were found liable to the workers' compensation carrier.
Huber moved for summary judgment on the ground that the injury to
Distefano occurred prior to the effective date of the Act, and the Act
could not be applied retrospectively. Lamborn and McCormick coun-
tered with the argument that the right of contribution does not become
fixed until one joint tortfeasor has paid more than his or her pro rata
share of the common liability. Since no judgment had yet been ob-
tained in the action, no payment discharging the common liability had
yet been made, and the Act having become effective before any right
became fixed, the two subcontractors argued that the Act was applicable
to the case, and that the third-party action was proper. The court re-
jected this argument stating that the right of contribution became fixed
at the time of the accident and not when payment was made by one
tortfeasor of more than his pro rata share.24 7 The court noted that
while the procedural right to institute an action for contribution did not
accrue until payment had been made, the inchoate, substantive right to
contribution existed from the time of the accident. Since the injury
occurred before the effective date of the Delaware Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, and since that Act created substantive rights the Dela-
ware court, held the Act inapplicable.2 4
This interpretation best accords with the commonly accepted mean-
ing of the word transaction when used in conjunction with tortious in-
jury. The transaction is the tortious act which gives rise to the common
liability; it is the injury or wrongful death which gives rise to a cause of
action.249 Accordingly, if Ohio's new act were to be applied to injuries
Bankers & Tel. Employers Ins. Co., 1 N.C. App. 122, 160 S.E.2d 115 (1968); Distefano v.
Lamborn, 81 A.2d 675 (Del. Super. Ct. 1951); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Leonard, 210
Ark. 575, 196 S.W.2d 919 (1946).
244 81 A.2d 675 (Del. Super. Ct. 1951).
247 Id. at 679-81.
248 Id.
249 Sylvester v. Evans, 109 Ohio App. 211, 160 N.E.2d 142 (1959). "Cause of action"
must be distinguished from "action." A "cause of action" is a right to relief, while an
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or wrongful deaths which occurred prior to its effective date it would
create new obligations or impose new duties with respect to transactions
already passed, and would be retrospective in operation. Since retro-
spective application is forbidden both by the Constitution of Ohio and by
Ohio Revised Code section 1.48, it must be concluded that the Act may
only apply to injury or wrongful death suffered on or after October 1st,
1976.
V. CONCLUSION
This concludes the survey of the problems which will be encountered
in the application of the new act providing for contribution among tort-
feasors. Obviously, it has been impossible to survey all of the potential
difficulties, because many of them simply cannot be anticipated before
they occur. But some of the more important ones have been examined,
and viable solutions have been suggested. There is, of course, no guar-
antee that the courts will agree with these solutions, or follow them,
since other solutions are possible, but it will be interesting to observe
how the courts will choose between the alternative solutions available
to them.
"action" is the proceeding to enforce that right. Spriggs v. Dredge, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 264,
140 N.E.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1955). As indicated in the text, the "cause of action" accrues
with the injury or wrongful death, but the right to bring an "action" for contribution does
not accrue until one tortfeasor pays more than his or her proportionate share of the corn-
mon liability arising out of the injury or wrongful death.
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CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
VI. APPENDiX
(Amended House Bill No. 531)
File 416
AN Acr
eff. 10-1-76
To enact sections 2307.31 and 2307.32 of the Revised
Code to provide for the contribution among two or more per-
sons jointly or severally liable in tort.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio:
Section 1. That sections 2307.31 and 2307.32 of the Revised Code
be enacted to read as follows:
Sec. 2307.31. (A) Except as otherwise provided in this section or
section 2307.32 of the revised code, where two or more persons are
jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property
or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among
them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any
of them. The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor
who has paid more than his proportionate share of the common liability,
and his total recovery is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of
his proportionate share. No tortfeasor is compelled to make contribu-
tion beyond his own proportionate share of the entire liability. There
is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally
caused or intentionally contributed to the injury or wrongful death.
(B) A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not
entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability
for the injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement nor
in respect to any amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of
what is reasonable.
(C) A liability insurer, which by payment has discharged in full or
in part the liability of a tortfeasor and has thereby discharged in full its
obligation as insurer, is subrogated to the tortfeasor's right of contribu-
tion to the extent of the amount it has paid in excess of the tortfeasor's
proportionate share of the common liability. This provision does not
limit or impair any right of subrogation arising from any other relation-
ship.
(D) This section does not impair any right of indemnity under exist-
ing law. Where one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another,
the right of the indemnity obligee is for indemnity and not contribution,
and the indemnity obligor is not entitled to contribution from the ob-
ligee for any portion of his indemnity obligation.
(E) This section does not apply to breaches of trust or of other
fiduciary obligations.
(F) In determining the proportionate shares of tortfeasors in the
entire liability their relative degrees of fault shall be considered. If
equity requires the collective liability of some as a group, the group shall
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constitute a single share, and principles of equity applicable to contribu-
tion generally shall apply.
(G) Whether or not judgment has been entered in an action against two
or more tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death, contribution
may be enforced by separate action.
Sec. 2307.32 (A) Where a judgment has been entered in an action
against two or more tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death,
contribution may be enforced in that action by judgment in favor of
one against other judgment debtors by motion upon notice to all parties
to the action.
(B) If there is a judgment for the injury or wrongful death against
the tortfeasor seeking contribution, any separate action by him to enforce
contribution must be commenced within one year after the judgment has
become final by lapse of time for appeal or after appellate review.
(C) If there is no judgment for the injury or wrongful death against
the tortfeasor seeking contribution, his right of contribution is barred
unless he has either discharged by payment the common liability with-
in the statute of limitations period applicable to the claimant's right of
action against him and has commenced his action for contribution within
one year after payment, or agreed while action is pending against him
to discharge the common liability and has within one year after the
agreement paid the liability and commenced his action for contribution.
(D) The recovery of a judgment for an injury or wrongful death
against one tortfeasor does not of itself discharge the other tortfeasors
from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless the judgment is
satisfied. The satisfaction of the judgment does not impair any right of
contribution.
(E) Valid answers to interrogatories by a jury or findings by a
court sitting without a jury in determining the liability of the several
defendants for an injury or wrongful death shall be binding as among
such defendants in determining their right to contribution.
(F) When a release or a convenant not to sue or not to enforce
judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable
in tort for the same injury or the same wongful death:
(1) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability
for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms otherwise provide, but
it reduces the claim against the other to the extent of any amount stipu-
lated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consider-
ation paid for it, whichever is the greater;
(2) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability
for contribution to any other tortfeasor.
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